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HOME IS WHERE THE NO-FAULT EVICTION
IS: THE IMPACT OF THE DRUG WAR ON
FAMILIES IN PUBLIC HOUSING
Peter J. Saghir*
INTRODUCTION
In 1990, Congress passed the Public and Assisted Housing
Drug Elimination Act in response to its findings that drug dealers
were imposing a “reign of terror” on federally subsidized housing
communities.1 In Department of Housing & Urban Development v.
* Brooklyn Law School Class of 2004; B.F.A., New York University, 1994.
The author would like to thank Marisa, Hae Jin, Jerry, and the rest of the staff of
the Journal of Law and Policy for their hard work and guidance. He also wishes
to thank his family for their unconditional support over the years. Special thanks
to Alexandra, my wife, my love.
1
Public and Assisted Housing Drug Elimination Act, Pub. L. No. 100-690,
102 Stat. 4181 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 11901-11925) (2003). See 42 U.S.C. §
11901 (2003). The statute is congressional findings which states that:
(1) the Federal Government has a duty to provide public and other
federally assisted low-income housing that is decent, safe, and free
from illegal drugs; (2) public and other federally assisted low-income
housing in many areas suffers from rampant drug-related or violent
crime; (3) drug dealers are increasingly imposing a reign of terror on
public and other federally assisted low-income housing tenants; (4)
local law enforcement authorities often lack the resources to deal with
the drug problem in public and other federally assisted low-income
housing, particularly in light of the recent reductions in Federal aid to
cities; (5) closer cooperation should be encouraged between public and
assisted housing managers, local law enforcement agencies, and
residents in developing and implementing anti-crime programs . . . and
(8) anti-crime strategies should be improved through the expansion of
community-oriented policing initiatives.
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Rucker, Chief Justice Rehnquist hijacked the language describing
drug dealers and applied it to four tenants of the Oakland Housing
Authority who had eviction proceedings brought against them for
the criminal acts of third parties.2 Shockingly enough, none of
these tenants participated in the criminal activity, and three of the
four of them had no knowledge the criminal activity of the third
parties was even occurring.3
The lease governing their housing is saddled with 42 U.S.C. §
1437d(l)(6), a statutorily mandated clause permitting the local
housing authority to evict tenants for the criminal acts of a third
person (“Provision”).4 And according to the Supreme Court of the
United States, the Provision permits eviction “whether or not the
tenant knew, or should have known, about the activity.”5 While
one might consider such a proposition outrageous and unfair, the
Supreme Court affirmed the Provision’s bright-line no-fault rule,
holding that it was not absurd and thus not a violation of the statute
to permit the eviction of tenants who have no knowledge of the

Id.
2

535 U.S. 125, 127 (2002) (“With drug dealers ‘increasingly imposing a
reign of terror on public and other federally assisted low-income housing
tenants,’ Congress passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988.” (quoting 42
U.S.C. § 11901(3))). See infra Part I.B (discussing the facts of Rucker v. Davis).
3
See Rucker v. Davis, 237 F.3d 1113, 1117 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc), rev’d
sub nom. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 (2002). The
fourth plaintiff, Herman Walker, was a seventy-five year-old disabled man who
required the attention of a caregiver. Id. at 1117. Mr. Walker received three
lease violations in two months because his caregiver possessed cocaine in the
apartment. Id. With the third violation, the housing authority instituted eviction
proceedings against Mr. Walker despite Mr. Walker firing his caregiver. Id.
4
42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6) (2003).
Each public housing agency shall utilize leases which . . . provide that
any criminal activity that threatens the health, safety, or right to
peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other tenants or any drug-related
criminal activity on or off such premises, engaged in by a public
housing tenant, any member of the tenant’s household, or any guest or
other person under the tenant’s control, shall be cause for termination
of tenancy.
Id.
5
Rucker, 535 U.S. at 130.
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criminal activity of a third party.6
Equating and grouping innocent tenants with drug dealers is
unfair at best.7 The excessive crime in the country’s public housing
projects over the past thirty years has resulted in a low standard of
living for its residents.8 While it is necessary for both our
government and individual communities to implement solutions to
reduce crime in public housing, the solutions and actions must be
balanced so as not to adversely affect law-abiding tenants. Both the
Provision and the Court’s holding in Rucker fail to adequately
6

42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(2) (2003) (prohibiting public housing authorities
from including “unreasonable terms and conditions [in their leases]”); Rucker,
535 U.S. at 134 (finding “it was reasonable for Congress to permit no-fault
evictions in order to ‘provide public and other federally assisted low-income
housing that is decent, safe, and free from illegal drugs’” (quoting 42 U.S.C. §
11901(1) (2003)). See Rucker, 535 U.S. at 131 (holding that the tenant need not
know of the drug-related criminal activity to be evicted for that drug-related
criminal activity). The Department of Housing and Urban Development agreed
and argued that such an interpretation was necessary. Id. at 133 n.4. Contra
Evelyn Nieves, Drug Ruling Worries Some in Public Housing, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
27, 2002, at A18; Robert Hornstein, Treena Kaye, & Daniel Atkins, Bush Public
Housing Versus Pearlie Rucker Public Housing: One Strike for the Poor and
How Many for the Rest of Us?, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 18, 2002, at 66 (criticizing
the impact of the Provision on the poor).
7
See Rucker, 535 U.S. at 134 (concluding that people who cannot control
the criminal acts of a household member are themselves a threat to the
community); HUD Public Housing Lease and Grievance Procedure, 56 Fed.
Reg. 51560, 51567 (Oct. 11, 1991) (“[A] family which does not or cannot
control drug crime, or other criminal activities by a household member which
threaten health or safety of other residents, is a threat to other residents and the
project.”).
8
See Otto J. Hetzel, Evolving Voices in Land Use Law: A Festschrift in
Honor of Daniel R. Mandelker, 3 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 415, 417 (2000)
(characterizing public housing as “cesspools of crime and drug activity”); U.S.
DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., IN THE CROSSFIRE, THE IMPACT OF GUN
VIOLENCE ON PUBLIC HOUSING COMMUNITIES 14 [hereinafter IN THE
CROSSFIRE] (“Persons residing in public housing are over twice as likely to
suffer from firearm-related victimization as other members of the population.
There is a strong correlation between income and violent crime; thus the lowincome population in public housing is especially vulnerable to gun violence.”),
at http://www.hud.gov/library/bookshelf18/pressrel/crossfir.pdf (last visited
Nov. 12, 2003).
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balance those interests.9 Instead of protecting innocent tenants, the
Provision and the Court’s interpretation endanger this vulnerable
group’s health and safety by exposing them to the possibility of
homelessness.10 Indeed, these law-abiding tenants are not only
victims of the crime in their communities, but also of our
government’s ill-conceived policies.11
This note focuses on the bad public policy that will likely result
from the Court’s strict liability interpretation of the Provision in
Rucker.12 Part I briefly looks at the Provision itself, the Supreme
9

See Rucker, 535 U.S. at 129-30 (permitting the eviction of a law-abiding
tenant even where they were unaware of criminal activity and therefore unable
to take preventive action); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6) (2003) (permitting
the eviction of tenants for the crimes of third parties).
10
See UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, MAYOR’S NATIONAL
HOUSING FORUM FACT SHEET (“The shortfall in affordable housing for the very
poorest now stands at 3.3 million units. These numbers understate the shortage
because higher-income households occupy 65% of the units affordable to the
poorest families.”), at http://www.usmayors.org/uscm/news/press_releases/
documents/housingfactsheet_052102.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2003)
[hereinafter U.S. MAYOR’S HOUSING FACT SHEET]; Judith Goldiner, Congress
Eyes Public-Housing Decontrol (reporting median national income of public
housing tenants is below $6,500), at http://www.tenant.net/Tengroup/
Metcounc/Apr96/brooke.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2003). See also NATIONAL
COALITION FOR THE HOMELESS, Fact Sheet #1: Why Are People Homeless?
(Sept. 2002) (“A lack of affordable housing and the limited scale of housing
assistance programs have contributed to the current housing crisis and to
homelessness.”), at http://www.nationalhomeless.org/causes.html.
11
See 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6) (providing for the eviction of tenants for the
criminal acts of a third party); IN THE CROSSFIRE, supra note 8, at 14 (reporting
that despite overall declining crime rates in public housing, “[p]ersons residing
in public housing are over twice as likely to suffer from firearm-related
victimization as other members of the population”). See also Rucker, 535 U.S. at
127-28 (holding that a tenant may be evicted for the criminal acts of a third
party even if the tenant did not know or should not have known of that activity);
infra note 70 (citing the Department of Housing and Urban Development’s “One
Strike and You’re Out” directive articulated by President Clinton).
12
See Rucker, 535 U.S. at 130 (holding section “1437d(l)(6)
unambiguously requires lease terms that vest local public housing authorities
with the discretion to evict tenants for the drug-related activity of household
members and guests whether or not the tenant knew, or should have known,
about the activity”) (emphasis added).
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Court and Ninth Circuit’s interpretations of the Provision, and
examples of how courts have struggled with no-fault evictions.13
Part II defines innocent tenant and presents examples of tenants
who have had eviction proceedings brought against them pursuant
to the Provision or a similar clause.14 Part III focuses on the
negative public policy the Provision creates by breaking up
families, imposing on tenants an affirmative duty to engage in
crime prevention and deterring recovery of people addicted to
drugs. Additionally, Part III proposes that because an indigent
tenant lacks meaningful choice in choosing living accommodations
and is at a procedural disadvantage with no bargaining power when
entering into the lease with the government for an apartment, the
lease is arguably unconscionable. Finally, Part IV presents
alternatives to the current strict liability policy that would ensure
safe housing for the community while allowing individual tenants
to feel secure in their homes and protected against arbitrary
evictions.
I.

THE POLICY OF SECTION 1437D(1)(6) AND HUD V. RUCKER

In response to Congressional findings that crime in public
housing had reached intolerable proportions, Congress passed the
Public and Assisted Housing Drug Elimination Act (the “Act”) as
part of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988.15 The Act included a

13

See, e.g., Hous. Auth. of Joliet v. Chapman, 780 N.E.2d 1106 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2002) (holding that in light of Rucker, a tenant need not have knowledge of
her son’s criminal activity or control over his actions to violate her lease).
14
States have enacted provisions similar to section 1437d(l)(6). See, e.g.,
N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 231 (McKinney 2003):
Whenever the lessee or occupant other than the owner of any building
or premises, shall use or occupy the same, or any part thereof, for any
illegal trade, manufacture or other business, the lease or agreement for
the letting or occupancy of such building or premises, or any part
thereof shall thereupon become void, and the landlord of such lessee or
occupant may enter upon the premises so let or occupied.
Id.
15
See supra note 1 (discussing Congressional findings); Public and
Assisted Housing Drug Elimination Act, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181
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provision requiring public housing authorities to issue leases that
provide for the termination of a tenant’s lease if the tenant, a
member of the tenant’s household or guest engages in any criminal
activity that threatens the peace and enjoyment of the premises by
other tenants.16 In applying this provision, some courts have used a
strict liability standard for eviction while others have required a
showing that the tenant knew or should have known of the criminal
activity to warrant eviction.17 The Ninth Circuit in Rucker v. Davis
held that “Congress did not intend § 1437d(l)(6) to permit the
eviction of innocent tenants.”18 The Supreme Court reversed the
Ninth Circuit and held that the local housing authorities have “the
discretion to terminate the lease of a tenant when a member of the
household or a guest engages in drug-related activity, regardless of
whether the tenant knew, or should have known, of the drugrelated activity.”19 Since the Court’s holding in Rucker, courts

(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 11901-11925) (2003).
16
See 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6).
17
See Hous. Auth. of New Orleans v. Green, 657 So. 2d 552, 552 (La. Ct.
App. 1995) (“The question in this case is whether a Housing Authority of New
Orleans [] tenant may be evicted because a guest in her apartment had illegal
drugs without her knowledge. The answer is yes.”); Ann Arbor Hous. Comm’n
v. Wells, 618 N.W.2d 43, 45 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000) (“[W]e hold that a public
housing tenancy may be terminated . . . regardless of whether the tenant had
knowledge of the drug-related activity conducted on or off the premises by the
tenant, a member of the tenant’s household, or a guest or another person under
the tenant’s control.”). But see Kimball Hill Mgmt. v. Roper, 733 N.E.2d 458,
465 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (requiring “tenant have some minimum connection with
the criminal activity before she can be evicted”); Charlotte Hous. Auth. v.
Patterson, 464 S.E.2d 68, 72 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995) (holding “good cause for
eviction does not exist when a public housing tenant is not personally at fault for
a breach of the criminal activity termination provision of a public housing lease
by a member of the tenant’s household”); Delaware County Hous. Auth. v.
Bishop, 749 A.2d 997, 1002 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000) (“[W]e refuse to hold a
tenant strictly liable for unforeseeable criminal acts committed, without the
tenant’s knowledge, by family members who are not under the tenant’s
control.”).
18
Rucker v. Davis, 237 F.3d 1113, 1127 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc), rev’d
sub nom. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 (2002).
19
Rucker, 535 U.S. at 136.
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have been forced to rethink their approaches to no-fault evictions.20
A. The Provision
The Public and Assisted Housing Drug Elimination Act
provides that:
Each public housing agency shall utilize leases which . . .
provide that any criminal activity that threatens the health,
safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of the premises by
other tenants or any drug-related criminal activity on or off
such premises, engaged in by a public housing tenant, any
member of the tenant’s household, or any guest or other
person under the tenant’s control, shall be cause for
termination of tenancy.21
The Act was passed at a time when drugs and violence plagued
public housing and local law enforcement lacked the resources to
bring the dangers of these crimes under control.22 It provides
grants to local housing authorities to implement measures to
minimize the negative impact of drugs and crime on their
communities.23 In past years, program grants have been used to
20

See Hous. Auth. of the City of Pittsburgh v. Fields, 816 A.2d 1099 (Pa.
2003) (reversing a lower court’s holding that the tenant could not be evicted
under section 1437d(l)(6) where her son was not under her control in light of
“the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Department of Housing and
Urban Development v. Rucker”). See also infra Part I.C (citing two courts
confronted with the change since the Court’s decision in Rucker).
21
42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6).
22
See 42 U.S.C. § 11901(2) (2003) (finding “public and other federally
assisted low-income housing in many areas suffers from rampant drug-related or
violent crime”); see also id. § 11901(5) (finding “local law enforcement
authorities often lack the resources to deal with the drug problem in public and
other federally assisted low-income housing, particularly in light of the recent
reductions in Federal aid to cities”).
23
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 11901-11925 (creating the Public and Assisted
Housing Drug Elimination Act); 42 U.S.C § 11903(a). Providing funds to public
housing and other low income housing projects for:
(1) the employment of security personnel; (2) reimbursement of local
law enforcement agencies for additional security and protective
services; . . . (5) the provision of training, communications equipment,
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employ security personnel, develop programs to reduce and
eliminate the use of drugs (including Youth Sports activities),
make physical changes to improve security and train and equip
voluntary tenant patrols.24 While the program has contributed to a
reduction in overall rates of crime, gun violence still remains a
severe problem.25
B. HUD v. Rucker
In HUD v. Rucker, the Supreme Court interpreted and applied
section 1437d(l)(6) to four elderly tenants of the Oakland Housing
Authority who were threatened with eviction because of the
criminal acts of other household family members or guests.26
Reversing the Ninth Circuit’s decision, the Supreme Court held
and other related equipment for use by voluntary tenant patrols acting
in cooperation with local law enforcement officials; (6) programs
designed to reduce use of drugs in and around public or other federally
assisted low-income housing projects, including drug-abuse prevention,
intervention, referral, and treatment programs . . . .
Id. See also Jim Moye, Can’t Stop the Hustle: The Department of Housing and
Urban Development’s “One Strike” Eviction Policy Fails to Get Drugs Out of
America’s Projects, 23 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 275, 281-82 (2003) (discussing
the new funding and programs instituted under the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
1988).
24
DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING & URBAN DEVELOPMENT, Drug Elimination
in Public and Assisted Housing, at http://www.hud.gov/nofa/suprnofa/
sprprt4g.cfm (content updated Dec. 5, 2000).
25
Living in Projects Raises the Risk of Being Shot, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16,
2000, at 16 (discussing a report issued by the Department of Housing and Urban
Development showing that while gun violence has increased, overall levels of
crime are falling in public housing projects); see IN THE CROSSFIRE, supra note
8, at 2 (“An analysis of detailed crime-trend data for 55 public housing
authorities . . . found that the crime rate declined in two-thirds of the authorities
(37 of the 55) between 1994 and 1997.”). But see id. at 14 (“The annual rate of
victimization between 1995 and 1997 for residents of public housing was 10 per
1,000 persons. The rate for persons not in public housing was 4 per 1,000.”).
26
See Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 128 (2002);
see also Rucker v. Davis, 237 F.3d 1113, 1117 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc), rev’d
sub nom. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 (2002) (noting
the plaintiffs’ ages: 63, 63, 71, and 75).
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that these tenants could be evicted pursuant to the Provision,
regardless of whether or not they knew or should have known of
the criminal acts.27 The policy and application of the Provision is
best understood with an appreciation for the distinctions between
the Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court’s interpretations of the
Provision.
1.

The Tenants

The four plaintiffs in Rucker were tenants of the Oakland
Housing Authority: Pearlie Rucker, 63, Willie Lee, 71, Barbara
Hill, 63, and Herman Walker, 75.28 Ms. Rucker, a resident of
public housing for sixteen years, had eviction proceedings brought
against her after her mentally disabled daughter was found
possessing cocaine several blocks from their home.29 The eviction
proceeding against Ms. Rucker was initiated despite routine
searches she made of her daughter’s room that came up negative
for drugs.30 Willie Lee, who lived in the public housing complex
for twenty-five years, and Barbara Hill, who lived in the public
housing complex for more than thirty years, had eviction
proceedings initiated against them after their grandsons were found
smoking marijuana in the parking lot of the housing complex.31
Neither Ms. Lee nor Ms. Hill was aware of their grandsons’ drug
use.32 The final plaintiff, Herman Walker, a partially paralyzed
former minister, had lived in public housing for eight years.33 The
27

Rucker, 535 U.S. at 127-28.
Rucker v. Davis, No. C 98-00781, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9345, at *5-7
(N.D. Cal. June 24, 1998), vacated, 203 F.3d 627 (9th Cir. 2000), amended by
237 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc), rev’d sub nom. Dep’t of Hous. &
Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 (2002).
29
Id. at *6.
30
Id.; Kara Platoni, Collateral Damage from the Drug War: Elderly OHA
Tenants Hope the Supreme Court Will Allow Them to Stay in their Homes, EAST
BAY EXPRESS (California), Oct. 17, 2001.
31
Rucker, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9345, at *6-7; Platoni, supra note 30.
32
Rucker, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9345, at *7.
33
Id. at *6; Emelyn Cruz Lat, One Strike Evictions: First of Two Parts,
SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER, Aug. 23, 1998, at A-10.
28
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Oakland Housing Authority instituted eviction proceedings against
Mr. Walker when his caregiver was found with cocaine in his
apartment.34 Even though he fired the caretaker upon being told
that he was being evicted for her criminal conduct, the building
manager told him it was too late and the housing authority would
file suit anyway.35
2.

The Ninth Circuit’s Approach

In Rucker, the Ninth Circuit found that the Provision “is not a
picture of clarity and may be subject to varying interpretations.”36
The Ninth Circuit concluded that the statute does not “expressly
address the level of personal knowledge or fault that is required for
eviction, or even make it clear who can be evicted.”37 Because of
the ambiguity, the Ninth Circuit looked to the overall statutory
scheme and noted that Congress has placed a number of
restrictions on the ability of local housing authorities to evict
tenants.38
34

Mr. Walker’s caregiver was found possessing cocaine in Mr. Walker’s
apartment in three instances within two months. Rucker v. Davis, 237 F.3d
1113, 1117 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc), rev’d sub nom. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban
Dev. v. Rucker, 533 U.S. 125 (2002). After a stroke left him paralyzed, Mr.
Walker hired a health care aide to assist him with cooking and bathing. Hard
Line in Public Housing, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2002, at 14. Mr. Walker, at the
time of hiring the aide, was unaware she was a cocaine user or that she hid drugs
and a crack pipe in Walker’s apartment. Id. She was caught possessing the drugs
during a security check of the building. Id.
35
Cruz Lat, supra note 33 (“Walker recalls the manager telling him, ‘We’ll
file suit and you won’t stand a chance. We win 98 percent of our cases.’”).
36
Rucker, 237 F.3d at 1123. The Ninth Circuit held that HUD’s
interpretation permitting the eviction of innocent tenants is inconsistent with
congressional intent and must be rejected under the first step of Chevron U.S.A.
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Rucker,
237 F.3d at 1119. In Chevron, the court held that an agency’s interpretation of a
statute should not be deferred to where Congress has spoken on the issue and the
agency’s interpretation is contrary to congressional intent. Chevron, 467 U.S. at
842-43.
37
Rucker, 237 F.3d at 1120.
38
Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(2) prohibiting leases with unreasonable
terms and conditions and § 1437d(l)(5) forbidding housing authorities from
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The court also considered the civil forfeiture provision of the
Controlled Substances Act, which appears in the same chapter and
subtitle of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 and is part of a single
legislative scheme to combat drug abuse in public housing.39 The
Controlled Substances Act provided for an innocent owner defense
and recognized an innocent owner as one who either did not know
of the conduct giving rise to the forfeiture, or did all that could
reasonably be expected under the circumstances to terminate such
criminal conduct.40 The Department of Housing and Urban
Development argued to the court that the innocent owner defense
applied only to civil forfeitures, not lease eviction proceedings, and
that because they were two different statutes, the innocent owner
defense was inapplicable to the Provision.41 The Ninth Circuit was
unpersuaded and reasoned that although the statutes were different,
they govern the same subject matter, were enacted at the same time
in the same chapter of the same Act and thus, it was fair to
presume the Congress meant them to be read together.42
The Department of Housing and Urban Development also put
forth a negative implication argument.43 It argued that Congress’s
amendment of the civil forfeiture provision of the Controlled
Substances Act to include an innocent tenant defense, when
considered with Congress’s failure to write such a defense into the
Provision, indicates they did not intend for one to be available
terminating tenancies except for “serious or repeated violation of the terms or
conditions of the lease or for other good cause”).
39
21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (2003); Rucker, 237 F.3d at 1121. “The ‘innocent
owner’ defense which then appeared in 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) is now codified at
18 U.S.C. § 983(d) as part of the general rules for civil forfeiture procedures.”
Id. at 1121 n.1.
40
18 U.S.C. § 983(d) (2003). An innocent owner is one who “(i) did not
know of the conduct giving rise to forfeiture; or (ii) upon learning of the conduct
giving rise to the forfeiture, did all that reasonably could be expected under the
circumstances to terminate such use of the property.” Id. at § 983(d)(2).
41
Rucker, 237 F.3d at 1121-22.
42
Id. at 1122 (“When dealing with two different statutes which not only
govern the same subject matter but were also enacted at the same time in the
same chapter of the same Act, we presume Congress meant them to be read
consistently.”).
43
Id.
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under the Provision.44 The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument
because the civil forfeiture amendment and section 1437d(l)(6)
were drafted by different Congresses and “[t]o say Congress could
have drafted the defense more explicitly in § 1437d(l)(6) is not to
say it did not do so at all.”45 Thus, the Ninth Circuit found that the
innocent tenant defense provided in the Controlled Substances Act
indicated that Congress intended for the Provision to apply to
innocent tenants under section 1437d(l)(6).46
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit recognized that the Provision
led to absurd results and stated that the court should not assume
that Congress intended absurd results in passing a law.47 The

44

See id. The civil forfeiture provision states:
The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States . . . . All
real property, including any right, title and interest (including any
leasehold interest) . . . which is used, or intended to be used, in any
manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission of, a
violation of this subchapter . . . except that no property shall be
forfeited under this paragraph, to the extent of an interest of an owner,
by reason of any act or omission established by that owner to have been
committed or omitted without the knowledge or consent of that owner.
21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7). The innocent owner defense in 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) is
now codified at 18 U.S.C. § 983(d).
45
Rucker, 237 F.3d at 1122.
46
Id. at 1123.
47
Id. at 1119, citing United States v. X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. 64, 69
(1994). In X-Citement Video, the owner and operator of X-Citement Video was
convicted for shipping 49 videotapes of Traci Lords performing in pornographic
films before she was 18. Id. at 66. The Protection of Children Against Sexual
Exploitation Act of 1977 makes it a criminal act to knowingly transport, ship,
receive or distribute a visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit
conduct. Id. at 67-68; see 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (2003). The issue before the Court
was whether the term “knowingly” applied only to the transport of the material
or to both the transport of the materials and the sexually explicit nature of the
materials. X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 69. The Ninth Circuit held that the
term “knowingly” applied only to the transport elements and the statute was
unconstitutional because it lacked a scienter requirement relating to the sexually
explicit nature of the materials. Id. at 67-68. The Supreme Court reversed and
held that the term knowingly applies to both the transport and explicit nature of
the materials. Id. at 69-70, 78. Otherwise, the Court noted, the statute would
“produce results that were not merely odd, but positively absurd.” Id. at 70. As
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absurd results are illustrated by the cases that were before the
court.48 Ms. Rucker took steps to stop her daughter’s drug abuse,
yet still had eviction proceedings brought against her.49
Additionally, Ms. Lee and Ms. Hill had eviction proceedings
instituted against them when their grandchildren were found
smoking marijuana in the parking lot, an act that can hardly be
considered a serious offense.50 Evicting such innocent tenants
an example, the Court explained that under the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation, “a
retail druggist who returns an uninspected roll of developed film to a customer
‘knowingly distributes’ a visual depiction and would be criminally liable if it
were later discovered that the visual depiction contained images of children
engaged in sexually explicit conduct.” Id. at 69. The Court concluded: “We do
not assume that Congress, in passing laws, intended such results.” Id. See infra
text accompanying notes 81-86 (citing examples of absurd evictions).
48
Rucker, 237 F.3d at 1124 (“We need look no further than the facts of this
case for an example of the odd and unjust results that arise under HUD’s
interpretation.”); see infra note 78 (criticizing the lack of geographical limits in
applying the statute); see also supra Part I.B.1 (discussing the plaintiffs’ in
Rucker).
49
Rucker, 237 F.3d at 1124 (“HUD conceded at oral argument that there
was nothing more Pearlie Rucker could have done to protect herself from
eviction, but argued that the statute authorized her eviction nonetheless.”).
50
See id. at 1117 (“[The Oakland Housing Authority] sought to evict Lee
and Hill because their grandsons were caught smoking marijuana together in the
apartment complex parking lot.”); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11357(b)
(West 2003) (“Except as authorized by law, every person who possesses not
more than 28.5 grams of marijuana, other than concentrated cannabis, is guilty
of a msisdemeanor and shall be punished by a fine of not more than one hundred
dollars ($100).”); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 221.05 (McKinney 2003) (“Unlawful
possession of mari[j]uana is a violation punishable only by a fine of not more
than one hundred dollars.”). See also NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR THE
REFORM OF MARIJUANA LAWS, Personal Use 1, at http://www.norml.org/pdf_
files/NORML_personal_use_introduction .pdf (last visited Nov. 30, 2003).
Since 1973, 12 state legislatures—Alaska, California, Colorado, Maine,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New York, North Carolina,
Ohio and Oregon—have enacted versions of marijuana
decriminalization. In each of these states, marijuana users no longer
face jail time (nor in most cases, arrest or criminal records) for the
possession or use of small amounts of marijuana.
Id.; Clifford Krauss, Chretien Leaves at Ease, Even If Bush Is Displeased, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 14, 2003, at A3 (“I don’t think a kid of 17 years old who has a joint
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undermines any incentive there could have been to take action
against the wrongdoing.51
Finally, the Ninth Circuit noted potential Due Process concerns
in that the tenant’s interest in the home was taken even where the
tenant’s home was not connected to the criminal act.52 The
should have a criminal record,” (quoting Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien
discussing liberalizing drug laws)); James C. McKinley Jr., Signs of a Drug War
Thaw; As Fear Eases, Rockefeller Laws Seem Less Necessary, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
21, 2001, at 29 Metropolitan Desk (“In 1977, President Carter formally
advocated legalizing marijuana in amounts up to an ounce.”); Sam Howe
Verhovek, Alaska’s Voters to Decide On Legalizing Marijuana, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 10, 2000, at A18 (discussing Alaskans’ vote on Proposition 5 which would
legalize marijuana consumption for anyone over 18).
51
See Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 134 (2002)
(reasoning that the strict liability inherent in “no-fault” evictions maximizes
deterrence). It could be argued, however, that not evicting tenants who take
steps to stop criminal activity would maximize deterrence, as the tenants may
more readily get involved if they know it will save them from eviction. Evicting
innocent tenants even where they took action to stop the prohibited conduct (as
did Pearlie Rucker in searching her daughter’s room and warning her of the
possibility of eviction, Rucker, 237 F.3d at 1117) creates a disincentive for
tenants to get involved for they will have nothing to gain by doing so. Thus,
prohibiting their eviction where they take action creates an incentive to get
involved and maximizes deterrence. Additionally, absurd results would be less
likely, and the Provision more reasonable, if the housing authorities were
obligated to consider all circumstances relevant to a particular case before
evicting the tenant. See HUD Public Housing Lease and Grievance Procedure,
24 C.F.R. § 966.4 (2003) (stating that in considering whether to evict, the
housing authorities “may consider all circumstances relevant to a particular
case” as opposed to shall consider the relevant circumstances) (emphasis
added). Among the circumstances that may be considered are the “seriousness of
the offending action,” “extent of participation by the leaseholder in the
offending action,” and “the effects that the eviction would have on family
members not involved in the offending activity.” Id. See infra Part IV
(discussing alternatives to the harsh no-fault eviction standard).
52
Rucker, 237 F.3d at 1125 (“HUD’s interpretation of § 1437d(l)(6), which
would permit the deprivation of a tenant’s property interest when the property
was not used in the commission of a crime and when the tenant did not know of
the illegal activity, would raise serious due process questions.”). See Nelson H.
Mock, Note, Punishing the Innocent: No-Fault Eviction of Public Housing
Tenants for the Actions of Third Parties, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1495, 1522-23 (1998)
(explaining that to establish a substantive due process claim, a tenant must show
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Department of Housing and Urban Development argued that the
Supreme Court’s decision in Bennis v. Michigan53 disposed of any
due process concerns because Bennis held that depriving an
innocent owner of a property right does not violate due process.54
Central to the Bennis Court’s holding, however, was the fact that
the property was used in connection with the criminal activity.55
Contrarily, in Rucker, the leased premises were not used in
connection with the crime.56 Although the Ninth Circuit found that
the evictions “raise serious due process questions,” it did not reach

the housing authority, a state actor, “(1) deprived the tenant of property (2) for
‘an irrational or invidious purpose’” (quoting Long Grove Country Club Estates,
Inc. v. Long Grove, 693 F. Supp. 640, 657 (N.D. Ill. 1988)).
53
516 U.S. 442 (1996).
54
In Bennis, the Court upheld the forfeiture of a car, id. at 453, against a
wife’s due process claim, where the car, which was jointly owned with the
husband, was forfeited as a public nuisance, id. at 446, when the husband used it
to engage in sexual activity with a prostitute, id. at 443. In Rucker, the Ninth
Circuit reasoned that the tenants had a property interest in their homes under
Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 451 (1982). Rucker, 237 F.3d at 1125. In
Greene, the Court held that public housing tenants had a property interest and
were deprived of that interest when they were not given adequate notice before
final eviction proceedings were instituted against them. Greene, 456 U.S. at 456.
55
See Bennis, 516 U.S. at 453. “[A] long and unbroken line of cases holds
that an owner’s interest in property may be forfeited by reason of the use to
which the property is put even though the owner did not know that it was to be
put to such use.” Id. at 446. “The Bennis automobile, it is conceded, facilitated
and was used in criminal activity.” Id. at 453. See also id. at 455 (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (stressing that in the case of an innocent owner and civil forfeiture,
courts should strictly apply “historical standards for determining whether
specific property is an ‘instrumentality’ of crime” before the property is
forfeited).
56
Rucker v. Davis, No. C 98-00781, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9345, at *6-7
(N.D. Cal. June 24, 1998), vacated, 203 F.3d 627 (9th Cir. 2000), amended by
237 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc), rev’d sub nom. Dep’t of Hous. &
Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 (2002) (finding Rucker’s daughter was
three blocks from their apartment and Lee and Hill’s grandsons possessed
marijuana in a parking lot of the housing complex). Herman Walker is an
exception in that his premise was used in connection with the criminal activity
because his caregiver, upon whom he was dependent, brought cocaine into the
apartment. Rucker, 237 F.3d at 1117.
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that issue.57 Instead, the court held “that if a tenant has taken
reasonable steps to prevent criminal drug activity from occurring,
but, for a lack of knowledge or other reason, could not realistically
exercise control over the conduct of a household member or guest,
§ 1437d(l)(6) does not authorize the eviction of such a tenant.”58
3.

The Supreme Court’s Approach

Despite the Ninth Circuit’s concerns over the enforcement of
section 1437d(l)(6) against innocent tenants, the Supreme Court
reversed, unanimously holding that the Provision “unambiguously
requires lease terms that vest local public housing authorities with
the discretion to evict tenants for the drug-related activity of
household members and guests whether or not the tenant knew, or
should have known, about the activity.”59 The Court found that a
plain reading of the statute would not lead to absurd results, there
was no need to consult legislative history, and the statute does not
violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.60
The Court grounded its holding in the plain language of the
statute, which provides that: “any drug-related criminal activity on
or off such premises, engaged in by a public housing tenant, any
member of the tenant’s household, or any guest or other person
under the tenant’s control, shall be cause for termination of
tenancy.”61 The Court reasoned that Congress’s decision not to
impose any knowledge qualification in the statute, “combined with
its use of the term ‘any’ to modify ‘drug-related criminal activity,’
57

Id. at 1125-26. “It is also a settled principle of statutory interpretation
that whenever possible, a statute should be construed to avoid substantial
constitutional concerns.” Id. at 1124.
58
Id. at 1126. In reaching it’s holding, the court construed the term
“control” as “a limitation on the breadth of the [P]rovision.” Id. The Provision
states in relevant part: “any drug-related criminal activity on or off such
premises, engaged in by a public housing tenant, any member of the tenant’s
household, or any guest or other person under the tenant’s control, shall be cause
for termination of tenancy.” 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6) (2003).
59
Rucker, 535 U.S. at 130.
60
Id. at 132-33, 135.
61
42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6); Rucker, 535 U.S. at 130.
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precludes any knowledge requirement.”62 In addition, the Court
found it important that under the statute, any drug related activity
is grounds for termination, “not just drug-related activity the tenant
knew, or should have known, about.”63 Because the Court found
the statute unambiguous, the Court did not consult the legislative
history.64
Not only did the Supreme Court find the statute unambiguous,
but it also found it reasonable and not a violation of section
1437d(l)(2), which prohibits public housing authorities from
including “unreasonable terms and conditions [in their leases].”65
While one might conclude that evicting a tenant for something they
did not do is unreasonable and, thus, a violation of section
1437d(l)(2), the Court found the statute reasonable because it does
not require the eviction of the tenant.66 Instead, the Court found, it
vests in the local housing authority the decision to evict based on
“the seriousness of the offending action,” and “the extent to which
the leaseholder has . . . taken all reasonable steps to prevent or

62

Rucker, 535 U.S. at 130-31 (citing United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S.
600, 609 (1989)); 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6).
63
Rucker, 535 U.S. at 131; 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6).
64
Rucker, 535 U.S. at 133. Had the Court consulted the legislative history
of section 1437d(l)(6), the Court would have found a Senate Report expressly
speaking to the issue of knowledge. See Rucker v. Davis, 237 F.3d 1113, 1123
(9th Cir. 2001) (en banc), rev’d sub nom. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v.
Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 (2002) (finding no House or Senate reports accompanied
the original version of § 1437d(l)(6), but finding Senate Report issued when the
Provision was amended in 1990). That Senate Report states:
The committee anticipates that each case will be judged on its
individual merits and will require the wise exercise of humane
judgment by the PHA and the eviction court. For example, eviction
would not be the appropriate course if the tenant had no knowledge of
the criminal activities of his/her guests or had taken reasonable steps
under the circumstances to prevent the activity.
S. REP. NO. 101-316, at 179 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5763, 5941.
65
Rucker, 535 U.S. at 133-34 n.5. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(2) (2003)
(“Each public housing agency shall utilize leases which . . . do not contain
unreasonable terms and conditions.”).
66
Rucker, 535 U.S. at 133.
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mitigate the offending action.”67 That discretion, the Court
concluded, makes the Provision reasonable and, thus, not a
violation of section 1437d(l)(2).68 Finally, the Court dismissed any
Due Process concerns because tenants receive notices of eviction
and are given the opportunity in the eviction proceedings to dispute
whether the lease provision was actually violated.69
C. The Influence of Rucker on Courts Struggling with NoFault Evictions
Prior to HUD v. Rucker, both state and federal courts were split
over whether Congress intended this “zero tolerance” policy.70
Since Rucker, courts have been forced to rethink their approaches
67

Id. at 134. See HUD Public Housing Lease and Grievance Procedure, 24
C.F.R. § 966.4 (2003).
68
Rucker, 535 U.S. at 133-34.
69
Id. at 136.
70
Compare Memphis Hous. Auth. v. Thompson, 38 S.W.3d 504, 512-13
(Tenn. 2001) (prohibiting the eviction of innocent tenants from federally
subsidized housing), with Minneapolis Pub. Hous. Auth. v. Lor, 591 N.W.2d
700, 701 (Minn. 1999) (permitting landlords to evict tenants in federally
subsidized housing who are unaware of criminality); compare Rucker v. Davis,
237 F.3d 1113, 1127 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc), rev’d sub nom. Dep’t of Hous. &
Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 (2002) (prohibiting innocent tenants from
being evicted) with Burton v. Tampa Hous. Auth., 271 F.3d 1274, 1275 (11th
Cir. 2001) (permitting federally subsidized landlords to evict tenants despite
tenants’ having no knowledge of criminality). The zero tolerance policy was
articulated by President Clinton as the “One Strike and You’re Out” policy. See
United States Department of Housing & Urban Development Directive No. 9616, Notice PIH 96-16 (HA) (issued Apr. 12, 1996) (discussing the “One Strike
and You’re Out” policy announced by President Clinton on March 28, 1996,
http://www.hud.gov/offices/pih/
publications/notices/96/pih96-16.pdf
(last
visited Dec. 1, 2003)). The “One Strike and You’re Out” provision “requires
public housing authorities to implement strong tenant screening, admissions, and
evictions rules that mandate exclusion from public housing and lease
termination for persons who engage in criminal activity, including drug-related
activity.” IN THE CROSSFIRE, supra note 8, at 13 (discussing the zero tolerance
“One Strike and You’re Out” policy requiring “public housing authorities to
implement strong tenant screening, admissions, and evictions rules that mandate
exclusion from public housing and lease termination for persons who engage in
criminal activity, including drug-related activity”).
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to no-fault evictions.71 For instance, before Rucker, in Housing
Authority of Joliet v. Keys, Illinois’s Appellate Division held that
“where a tenant could not realistically exercise control over the
conduct of a household member or guest due to lack of knowledge
or some other reason, section 1437d(l)(6) [did] not authorize the
eviction of that tenant.”72 However, in the wake of Rucker, the
same court held that according to the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the Provision, local public housing authorities
have discretion to terminate the lease of a tenant when a member
of the household or a guest causes a violation of the lease by
engaging in drug related criminal activity, “regardless of whether
the tenant knew, or should have known, of the drug-related
activity.”73
Similarly, before Rucker, New Jersey recognized an “innocent
lessee exception” to eviction proceedings commenced for a thirdparty’s criminal activity.74 In Oakwood Plaza Apartments v. Smith,
71

See Hous. Auth. of Joliet v. Chapman, 780 N.E.2d 1106, 1107-08 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2002); Hous. Auth. of the City of Pittsburgh v. Fields, 816 A.2d 1099
(Pa. 2003) (reversing a lower court’s holding that the tenant could not be evicted
under section 1437d(l)(6) where her son was not under her control in light of
“the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Department of Housing and
Urban Development v. Rucker”).
72
Hous. Auth. of Joliet, 761 N.E.2d at 344. In Housing Authority of Joliet,
the local housing authority brought an action to evict Patricia Keys from her
home when her adult grandson confessed to robbing and shooting an individual
at Keys’ residence. Id. at 340. Keys was a patient in the hospital when the crime
occurred. Id. Nonetheless, one month later the housing authority served Ms.
Keys with a notice to terminate her tenancy. Id. The court found that Ms. Keys,
described by the trial court as “an elderly woman in a walker, [whose] court
appearances had to be scheduled consistent with her appointments for dialysis,”
did not have control over her adult grandson. Id. at 344 (citation omitted). The
court affirmed the trial court’s holding that “a tenant ‘without notice and without
control over guests or family members cannot lose his or her lease hold [sic]
interest in the property.’” Id. at 340.
73
Id. at 344. See supra Part I.B.3 (discussing the Supreme Court’s
interpretation in Rucker).
74
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.1–61.12 (West 2003):
No lessee or tenant . . . may be removed by the Superior Court from
any house . . . except upon establishment of one of the following
grounds as good cause . . . the tenant or lessee of such leased premises,
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New Jersey’s Appellate Division held that to justify eviction—the
“ultimate sanction”—a court must find the tenant permitted the
guest to be in the apartment, and the tenant knew the guest was
violating the state drug laws.75 The court specifically recognized
that to hold otherwise would run contrary to the remedial purpose
of the act—to “address [a] critical shortage of residential housing
and to prevent ‘the dispossession of tenants who are paying their
rent and generally complying with their obligations as tenants.’”76
After Rucker, New Jersey’s innocent lessee exception was severely
weakened, for the New Jersey courts were free to uphold evictions
of tenants unaware of the criminal activity of a household guest or
member.77
II. MEET THE INNOCENT TENANT
The Provision fails in large part due to its broad reach.78 To
knowingly harbors or harbored therein a person who committed such an
offense [i.e., use, possession, manufacture, dispensing or distribution of
an illegal narcotic], or otherwise permits or permitted such a person to
occupy those premises for residential purposes . . . .
Id. at § 2A:18-61.1(p) (emphasis added).
75
Oakwood Plaza Apartments v. Smith, 800 A.2d 265, 267 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2002), quoting Hous. Auth. of Hoboken v. Alicea, 688 A.2d 108, 110
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.1997) (characterizing eviction from public housing as
the “ultimate sanction”). In Alicea, the court held that a tenant must not only
“‘permit’ a drug offender to occupy the leased premises, but must also tolerate
the offender’s occupancy of the premises knowing that such person has violated
the [Comprehensive Drug Reform Act].” Alicea, 688 A.2d at 110.
76
Alicea, 688 A.2d at 110.
77
See Oakwood Plaza Apartments, 800 A.2d at 267. Instead the court
emphasized the Supreme Court’s recognition that various factors should be
evaluated when deciding whether to evict. Id. at 268. The factors are: the
seriousness of the violation, the effect of the eviction on the household members
not involved in the criminal activity, and the willingness to remove the
wrongdoing household member from the lease as a condition for continued
occupancy. Id. at 268.
78
See Rucker v. Davis, 237 F.3d 1113, 1124 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc),
rev’d sub nom. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 (2002)
(criticizing the lack of geographical limits in applying the statute). The
Department of Housing and Urban Development acknowledged “the statute
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illustrate this point, it is important to understand who is subject to
liability under the Provision. Not only is the person accused of
committing the crime subject to eviction for their criminal acts, but
so also is the tenant of record, who may be unconnected to and
lack any knowledge about the criminal activity.79 This person is
often referred to as the innocent tenant whom the Ninth Circuit
described as a tenant who “did not know of or have any reason to
know of such activity or took all reasonable steps to prevent the
activity from occurring.”80
These innocent low-income public housing tenants are
exceptional victims of their circumstances: Not only do they have
high rates of crime, including violent crime, to fear, but the threat
of homelessness as well.81 The innocent tenant is Rosario Albino, a

would apply and permit eviction of an entire family if a tenant’s child was
visiting friends on the other side of the country and was caught smoking
marijuana, even if the parents had no idea the child had ever engaged in such
activity and even if they had no realistic way to control their child’s actions
3,000 miles away.” Id.
79
See 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6) (2003). “[A]ny drug-related criminal activity
on or off such premises, engaged in by a public housing tenant, any member of
the tenant’s household, or any guest or other person under the tenant’s control,
shall be cause for termination of tenancy.” Id.; see also Dep’t of Hous. & Urban
Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 131 (2002) (holding “any drug-related activity
engaged in by the specified persons is grounds for termination, not just drugrelated activity that the tenant knew, or should have known, about”).
80
See Rucker, 237 F.3d at 1115-16; see also 18 U.S.C. § 983(d)(2) (2003)
(stating that an innocent owner is one who “(i) did not know of the conduct
giving rise to forfeiture; or (ii) upon learning of the conduct giving rise to the
forfeiture, did all that reasonably could be expected under the circumstances to
terminate such use of the property”). In Rucker, Rucker did not know of her
granddaughter’s drug use, regularly searched her room for evidence of drug use,
and warned her and others that drug use on the premises could result in eviction.
Rucker v. Davis, No. C 98-00781, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9345, at *6 (N.D. Cal.
June 24, 1998), vacated, 203 F.3d 627 (9th Cir. 2000), amended by 237 F.3d
1113 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc), rev’d sub nom. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v.
Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 (2002). Similarly, Lee and Hill were not aware of any
prior illegal drug activity by their grandsons and warned them that such
prohibited conduct could result in eviction. Id. at *7.
81
See Rucker, 237 F.3d at 1115. The Ninth Circuit stated:
Many of our nation’s poor live in public housing projects that, by many
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sixty-eight year-old widowed mother of eight with a total monthly
fixed income of $411.82 The court found her only fault was “in
raising two daughters who went astray and got involved in
narcotics.”83 The innocent tenant is Ms. Green, “an exemplary
tenant of the housing complex” and “volunteer on the Resident
Council Board for the complex” who was evicted from her
apartment when her daughter’s friend secretly brought drugs into
the home.84 And finally, the innocent tenant is Teri Wells, who was
evicted from her home where she and her children had lived for
nine years when her brother, who was staying with her on a
temporary basis after living in a homeless shelter, was found
selling narcotics in the vicinity of her home.85 That she had no
knowledge of the activity and asked her brother to leave upon his
arrest was not enough to keep the housing authority from evicting
her.86
Eviction proceedings do not necessarily result in evictions,
though.87 In the case of the respondents in Rucker, for instance, the

accounts, are little more than illegal drug markets and war zones.
Innocent tenants live barricaded behind doors, in fear for their safety
and the safety of their children. What these tenants may not realize is
that, under existing policies of the Department of Housing and Urban
Development [], they should add another fear to their list: becoming
homeless . . . .
Id. See also HUD USER, U.S. DEP’T. OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., Gun-Related
Violence: The Costs to Public Housing Communities (“In 1998 there were an
estimated 360 gun-related homicides in 66 of the Nation’s 100 largest public
housing authorities.”), at http://www.huduser.org/periodicals/rrr/rrr_3_2000/
0300_1.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2003); NATIONAL COALITION FOR THE
HOMELESS, Fact Sheet #1: Why Are People Homeless? (Sept. 2002) (“Two
trends are largely responsible for the rise in homelessness over the past 20-25
years: a growing shortage of affordable rental housing and a simultaneous
increase in poverty.”), at http://www.nationalhomeless.org/causes. html.
82
Lloyd Realty Corp. v. Albino, 552 N.Y.S.2d 1008 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. County
1990).
83
Id. at 1011.
84
Hous. Auth. v. Green, 657 So. 2d 552, 553 (La. Ct. App. 1995).
85
Ann Arbor Hous. Comm’n v. Wells, 618 N.W.2d 43, 44 (Mich. 2000).
86
Id. at 44-45.
87
See, e.g., infra note 89 (citing cases that did not result in eviction). While
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Oakland Housing Authority dismissed the eviction proceedings
against three of the four tenants.88 Additionally, in New York,
several eviction proceedings have been dismissed at the trial
level;89 however, some are not overturned until appealed. In Brown
no-fault evictions might be vacated on appeal, certainly not all are vacated and
even where they are, the family has nonetheless been put in a dangerous position
bordering on homelessness. See, e.g., Lloyd Realty Corp., 552 N.Y.S.2d at 1009
(acknowledging the merits of a narcotics eviction program, but also recognizing
“concern regarding evictions from residential premises of innocent family
members including those who are senior citizens, disabled tenants and tenants
with infant children, especially in light of the present acute housing shortage”).
88
Lakiesha McGhee, 2 of 4 ‘Evicted’ Oakland Tenants Can Stay,
OAKLAND TRIB., Apr. 5, 2002, at Front Page (reporting that one week after the
Supreme Court’s decision in Rucker, the Oakland Housing Authority dropped
eviction proceedings against Lee and Hill). The case against Rucker was
dismissed in 1998. Id. The Oakland Housing Authority is still reviewing the case
against Herman Walker. OAKLAND HOUSING AUTHORITY, OHA Reviews Cases
(Apr. 4, 2002), at http://www.oakha.org/rucker.html.
89
See, e.g., Lloyd Realty Corp., 552 N.Y.S.2d at 1008. In Lloyd Realty
Corp., petitioner landlord sought to recover possession of the tenant’s premises
after a “buy and bust” operation resulted in the arrest of the tenant’s daughter
and daughter’s friend for selling narcotics in front of the subject premises. Id. at
1009. Rosario Albino, the tenant, lived in the apartment for fifteen years. Id. She
was sixty-eight, widowed, suffered from hypertension and bronchial asthma, had
no knowledge of the drug activity, and received a total monthly income of $411
from Social Security Widow’s Pension and Supplemental Security Income. Id.
at 1009, 1011. The court reasoned that to uphold such an eviction, it must be
shown that Mrs. Albino knew of the illegal drug activity and thus acquiesced in
the use of the premises for such purposes. Id. at 1010. The court did not find that
the evidence supported such a finding. Id. Additionally, the court found that
“that the eviction of a senior citizen who has no knowledge nor involvement of
the illegal drug activity conducted in her apartment will [not] further serve the
purpose of the narcotics eviction program. Id. See, e.g., 1895 Grand Concourse
Assocs. v. Ramos, 685 N.Y.S.2d 580 (Civ. Ct. Bronx County 1998). In 1895
Grand Concourse, the landlord sought to recover possession of the respondent
tenant’s premises alleging respondent has been using the premises for the illegal
the sale of drugs. Id. Tenant, Theresa Ramos, resided in the apartment for the
last twenty-five years with her seven children and husband. Id. at 582. She was
never arrested prior to the charges underlying this case and those charges against
her were dismissed. Id. She did not sell nor did she consume drugs. The landlord
sought recovery when a search of the premises resulted in the police finding
cocaine. Id. at 581. A detective involved in the search testified that the search

SAGHIR1.DOC

392

3/3/2004 1:52 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

v. Popolizio, for example, Rachel Brown’s tenancy was terminated
when her son, who had not lived with her for six months, was
arrested on housing grounds for possession of a controlled
substance in the seventh degree, a Class A misdemeanor.90 The
possession was his first arrest, and he pled to disorderly conduct, a
violation.91 Ms. Brown had lived in the same apartment for nearly
twenty years and at the time of the eviction proceedings resided
there with her twin minor daughters, another son and his family.92
The Appellate Division vacated the housing authority’s decision as
contrary to the law and an abuse of discretion.93 The court noted
that the housing authority’s management manual did not authorize
termination of tenancy for misdemeanor non-desirable acts, such
as the one here, unless there are other factors of an undesirable
nature on the tenant’s record.94 The court found that Ms. Brown’s
record contained no complaint of any kind during her twenty-year
tenancy.95 Thus, the court found the hearing officer’s
determination “arbitrary and capricious, contrary to law, and the
penalty imposed constituted an abuse of discretion.”96
In Robinson v. Martinez, Tawana Robinson had eviction
proceedings brought against her when she violated a stipulation
she entered into with the housing authority to exclude her son from

did neither indicate any sale of narcotics from the premises nor any information
that drugs were being sold in the apartment. Id. at 581-82. Ms. Ramos’s husband
also credibly testified that he was using the cocaine for his personal
consumption and that no one in his family knew about his consumption. Id. at
582. The court dismissed the landlord’s action to recover the premises because
no evidence was presented indicating that narcotics were sold from the premises
and no evidence was presented showing that Ms. Ramos knew or should have
known of her husband’s drug use. Id. at 583.
90
569 N.Y.S.2d 615, 617 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991); see N.Y. PENAL LAW §
220.02 (McKinney 2003). A class A misdemeanor is punishable by a fine of up
to $1,000. Id. at § 80.05.
91
Brown, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 617, 622.
92
Id. at 617.
93
Id. at 622.
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
Id.
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the premises.97 The housing authority instituted termination
proceedings after she permitted her son, who was seriously ill, to
spend the night at her apartment so that she could assure that he
went to a doctor’s appointment for his bone disease at a hospital
across the street from the project.98 The Appellate Department,
however, found the penalty of termination “shockingly
disproportionate” in light of her twenty-one-year residency, her
compelling explanation for allowing her son to stay only for one
night and the fact that her son’s stay there did not compromise the
health or safety of other tenants.99
While one might argue these cases demonstrate that courts
serve as an effective check on the often harsh decisions of housing
authorities, one must consider the number of cases that are not
appealed for lack of resources.100 In addition, courts often uphold
evictions of innocent tenants even when they are challenged. In
Syracuse Housing Authority v. Boule, for example, Ann Boule was
evicted for the criminal activity of her baby sitter.101 Ms. Boule
was on her way to work when her usual baby-sitter became
unavailable.102 To avoid jeopardizing her employment, she called
the child’s father at the last minute to baby-sit while she worked.103
Unbeknownst to Ms. Boule, while she was at work, the father
97

764 N.Y.S.2d 94 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003). In March 1997, her son moved
out of the apartment as part of an earlier settlement agreement with the housing
authority in connection with an eviction proceeding brought against the tenant
for her son’s unlawful possession of marijuana. Matter of Robinson v. Finkel,
Decision of Interest, 228 N.Y. L.J. 18 (2002). See supra Part III.C (explaining
the policy of exclusion).
98
Robinson, 764 N.Y.S.2d at 95-96.
99
Id.
100
See 42 U.S.C. § 2996 (2003) (finding, in connection with the creation of
the Legal Services Corporation, that “there is a need to provide high quality
legal assistance to those who would be otherwise unable to afford adequate legal
counsel and to continue the present vital legal services program”).
101
Syracuse Hous. Auth. v. Boule, 701 N.Y.S.2d 541, 541 (N.Y. App. Div.
1999).
102
Syracuse Hous. Auth. v. Boule, 658 N.Y.S.2d 776, 777 (Syracuse City
Ct. 1996), aff’d,3 676 N.Y.S.2d 741 (Onandaga County Ct. 1998), rev’d, 701
N.Y.S.2d 541.
103
Id.
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invited two other people to the house where they sold drugs and
were subsequently arrested.104 While the lower court held that
evicting the mother, the tenant of record, was unwarranted since
she was unaware of, did not consent to and could not foresee the
criminal activity, the Appellate Division affirmed the eviction of
Ms. Boule and applied a strict liability standard.105 The Appellate
Division found the housing authority is not bound to exercise
discretion or consider mitigating circumstances where there is a
violation of section 1437d(l)(6).106
Similarly, in San Francisco, a mother and father were evicted
from their federally subsidized apartment for failure to ensure that
no drug-related activity took place on the premises.107 During a
routine search of their son’s jacket hanging in a closet, the police
found four packets of narcotics.108 Despite no evidence that the
parents knew of, controlled, acquiesced in or had reason to know
of their son’s possession of narcotics in the apartment, the eviction
was upheld.109 The court reasoned that the eviction was proper
because the parents were not being evicted for the conduct of their
son, but for their failure to fulfill their commitment in the lease to
104

Id. The court found:
The following further facts are stipulated: respondent did not know Mr.
Troutman had invited the other two persons upon the premises and she
did not give permission for them to be present; none of the three
persons arrested reside at the apartment; respondent was unaware of the
presence or sale of the drugs on the premises; respondent was not in
any way involved in the possession or sale of the drugs; respondent was
not criminally charged regarding this incident; respondent believed that
Mr. Troutman did not have a criminal record; and neither neighbors nor
the Housing Authority notified respondent of the criminal activity
during its occurrence.
Id.
105

See id. at 780 (applying a balancing approach at the trial level); but see
Boule, 701 N.Y.S.2d at 542 (applying strict liability approach in the appellate
division).
106
Boule, 701 N.Y.S.2d at 542.
107
San Francisco Hous. Auth. v. Guillory, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 367, 372 (Cal.
App. Dept. 1995).
108
Id. at 369.
109
Id. at 369-70, 372.
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ensure and prevent any drug activity from occurring on the
premises.110
III. IT’S JUST BAD PUBLIC POLICY
The Provision implements poor public policy in several ways.
First, the Provision puts tenants at risk by implying an affirmative
duty on tenants to prevent and stop criminal behavior of third
parties.111 Second, the Provision inhibits the recovery of tenants
who are substance abusers by denying them one of the most
fundamental components of recovery—family.112 Third, the
provision breaks up families by conditioning their continued
occupancy on permanently excluding the third party, who often is
a family member.113 And finally, the Provision is unconscionable
and renders the lease an unconscionable contract.114
A. The Provision Unfairly Imposes an Affirmative Duty on
Public Housing Tenants to Prevent and Stop the
Criminal Behavior of Third Parties
While one may have a moral duty to prevent harm, the law
distinguishes this from causing harm, punishing only the latter
affirmative action.115 Generally, one is not liable for failing to
act.116 Under the Provision, however, tenants are under an

110

Id. at 372 (holding “drug-related activity by any member of a tenant
household is cause per se for termination of the lease where, as here, the housing
authority receives federal funds”).
111
See infra Part III.A.
112
See infra Part III.B.
113
See infra Part III.C.
114
See infra Part III.D.
115
See, e.g., Thomas Morawetz, Book Review, The Jurisprudence of Duty
and Obedience, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1135 (1988).
116
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (1965) (“The fact that the
actor realizes or should realize that action on his part is necessary for another’s
aid or protection does not of itself impose upon him a duty to take such
action.”); Id. at Illustration 1 (“A sees B, a blind man, about to step into the street
in front of an approaching automobile. A could prevent B from so doing by a
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affirmative obligation, subject to termination, to ensure no tenant,
member of the household or guest under the tenant’s control
engages in criminal activity.117 Courts have expressly upheld this
duty of tenants to ensure that no other tenant or guest engages in a
criminal drug activity.118
This requirement is unfair because, as seen with the elderly and
disabled plaintiffs in Rucker, not all residents are capable of
ensuring that a member of the resident’s household, guest or other
person does not engage in criminal activity.119 Moreover, it is poor
word or touch without delaying his own progress. A does not do so, and B is run
over and hurt. A is under no duty to prevent B from stepping into the street, and
is not liable to B.”); see L.S. Ayres & Co. v. Hicks, 40 N.E.2d 334, 336 (Ind.
1942) (“One is not bound to guard against a happening which there is no reason
to anticipate or expect.”).
117
See HUD Public Housing Lease and Grievance Procedure, 24 C.F.R. §
966.4(f) (2003). The lease shall provide that the tenant shall be obligated:
(12)(i) To assure that no tenant, member of the tenant’s household, or
guest engages in: (A) Any criminal activity that threatens the health,
safety or right to peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other residents;
or (B) Any drug-related criminal activity on or off the premises; (ii) To
assure that no other person under the tenant’s control engages in: (A)
Any criminal activity that threatens the health, safety or right to
peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other residents; or (B) Any
drug-related criminal activity on the premises; (iii) To assure that no
member of the household engages in an abuse or pattern of abuse of
alcohol that affects the health, safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of
the premises by other residents.
Id. This obligation is a great burden in light of the Supreme Court’s ruling that
the phrase under control “means control in the sense that the tenant has
permitted access to the premises.” See Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker,
535 U.S. 125, 131 (2002).
118
See Burton v. Tampa Hous. Auth., 271 F.3d 1274, 1276 (11th Cir. 2001)
(“Embodied within this agreement is the understanding that it is the resident’s
obligation to ensure that no member of the resident’s household, guest, or other
person under the resident’s control shall engage in any criminal activity on THA
premises.”); see also Remeeder H.D.F.C., Inc. v. Francis, No. 2000-1406 K C,
slip op. at 1 (N.Y. App. Term Dec. 6, 2001) (comparing 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6)
(2003) with 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(5) (2003) and concluding that “both versions
of the federal statute seem to make tenants the guarantors of the conduct by
other household members, guests, or other people under a tenant’s control”).
119
Rucker v. Davis, 237 F.3d 1113, 1117 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc), rev’d
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public policy to expect a civilian to endanger himself by implying
a duty to spot illegal drug activity and stop it.120 In fact, Congress
has recognized this danger and protected against it in other
contexts.121 Such impositions on people not qualified to fulfill
these tasks will likely lead to incorrect reporting of crimes as well
as potentially dangerous situations for the civilians involved.122

sub nom. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 (2002) (noting
Pearlie Rucker was 63, Willie Lee, 71, Barbara Hill, 63, and Herman Walker, 75
and disabled). See Stacy Finz, Evictions of Seniors Assailed in Court; One Strike
Policy Called Racist, Classist, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Sept. 20, 2000, at A20
(describing how Herman Walker, who is partially paralyzed, requires around the
clock care); see also Part I.B.1 (discussing the plaintiffs in Rucker).
120
See Rucker, 535 U.S. at 134 (remarking “a tenant who ‘cannot control
drug crime, or other criminal activities by a household member which threaten
health or safety of other residents, is a threat to other residents and the
project’”); see also Michael A. Cavanagh & M. Jason Williams, Low-Income
Grandparents as the Newest Draftees in the Government’s War on Drugs: A
Legal and Rhetorical Analysis of Department of Housing and Urban
Development v. Rucker, 10 GEO. J. POVERTY LAW & POL’Y 157 (2003).
The Court’s reflection thus blames the victims. The full force of the
United States government, consisting of the courts, the military, and the
police, has been unable to stop drug crime for more than thirty
years . . . . The Court simply fails to explain how poor elderly
grandmothers and disabled persons are, single-handedly, to rid the
PHAs of drug dealers.
Id. at 164-65.
121
See 18 U.S.C. § 983(d)(2)(B)(ii) (2003) (setting forth an innocent owner
defense, the statute states: “A person is not required by this subparagraph to take
steps that the person reasonably believes would be likely to subject any person
(other than the person whose conduct gave rise to the forfeiture) to physical
danger”); see also William Raspberry, Clean Up Public Housing With One
Strike, TIMES UNION, Apr. 1, 2002, at A9 (“A rule requiring eviction under any
and every circumstance of family-member involvement with criminality would
be just another example of ‘zero tolerance’ gone mad.”).
122
See Cavanagh & Williams, supra note 120, at 165 (“The Court simply
fails to explain how poor elderly grandmothers and disabled persons are, singlehandedly, to rid the PHAs of drug dealers.”); 18 U.S.C. § 983(d)(2)(B)(ii)
(stating in connection with a civil forfeiture defense that “[a] person is not
required . . . to take steps that the person reasonably believes would be likely to
subject any person (other than the person whose conduct gave rise to the
forfeiture) to physical danger”).
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Nonetheless, the Chief Justice remarked that if a tenant cannot
control the criminal activity of someone else, the tenant is a threat
to the community, and the threat warrants eviction.123 According to
this reasoning, a paralyzed minister is a threat to the community
because he did not stop his caregiver, upon whom he was
dependent, from storing drugs in his apartment.124 By the Court’s
logic, it seems the only people who are truly “safe” enough to live
in public housing are people with detective-like skills and the
courage to confront criminals about their illegal behavior and
subdue them when they pose a physical or criminal threat.
Finally, a grandparent or parent should be entitled to the
presumption that their children are not engaged in a criminal
activity.125 It is unfair to hold someone liable for what amounts to
123

See Rucker, 535 U.S. at 134. The Supreme Court reasoned:
[T]here is an obvious reason why Congress would have permitted local
public housing authorities to conduct no-fault evictions: Regardless of
knowledge, a tenant who “cannot control drug crime, or other criminal
activities by a household member which threaten health or safety of
other residents, is a threat to other residents and the project.”
Id. (quoting HUD Public Housing Lease and Grievance Procedure, 56 Fed. Reg.
51560, 51567 (Oct. 11, 1991)). In an apparent attempt to soften the harsh
language, the Federal Register states that “If a tenant cannot control criminal
activity by a household member, the tenant can request that the PHA remove the
person from the lease as an authorized unit occupant, and may seek to bar access
by that person to the unit.” 56 Fed. Reg. 51560. While this might work with
someone who is not a member of the family or whom is not wanted on the
premises, the idea that a family that desires to stay united should simply call the
housing authorities to remove the offender, especially in the case of a low-level
crime like smoking marijuana, is absurd. See supra note 50 and accompanying
text (citing California statute classifying possession of marijuana as a
misdemeanor and New York statute classifying it as a violation). Furthermore,
even if the tenant calls upon the housing authority to remove the offender, the
tenant may still be evicted. See supra note 51 (explaining that courts are not
obligated to consider all circumstances relative to a particular eviction case, but
may consider them in its discretion).
124
See, e.g., Rucker, 535 U.S. at 131-33 (explaining that a tenant’s eviction
may rest solely on his or her having provided an individual engaged in drugrelated activity with “access to the premises”).
125
See Daniel E. Witte, Note, People v. Bennett: Analytic Approaches to
Recognizing a Fundamental Parental Right Under the Ninth Amendment, 1996
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failing to report their son or daughter because they might be using
drugs.126 Such a duty should not be imposed upon a familial
relationship where trust is an essential component to the health of
the relationship.127
BYU L. REV. 183, 221 (1996) (“In the realm of family law, the presumption
‘that children ordinarily will be best cared for by those bound to them by the ties
of nature’ serves a similar function as the presumption of ‘innocent until proven
guilty’ . . . . Without such basic presuppositions, an existing orderly and secure
society cannot long maintain itself.”) (citations omitted).
126
See Rucker, 237 F.3d at 1117 (“Lee and Hill contend they had no prior
knowledge of any illegal drug activity by their grandsons.”). Because plaintiff’s
Barbara Hill and Willie Lee had no knowledge of their grandson’s marijuana use
they had no reason to either report the situation to the housing authority or
attempt to have them excluded from the household. See also HUD Public
Housing Lease and Grievance Procedure, 24 C.F.R. § 966.4 (2003) (“Exclusion
of culpable household member. The PHA may require a tenant to exclude a
household member in order to continue to reside in the assisted unit, where that
household member has participated in or been culpable for action or failure to
act that warrants termination.”). Nonetheless, it is clear that it would be to their
advantage, insofar as being able to maintain their residences, to just report their
grandsons because it is possible they may be using drugs.
127
See Harkness v. Fitzgerald, 701 A.2d 370, 373 (Me. 1997) (“As a
general rule, parent and child relationships are based on trust . . . .”); In re A. &
M., 403 N.Y.S.2d 375, 380 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978).
The role of the family, particularly that of the mother and father, in
establishing a child’s emotional stability, character and self-image is
universally recognized. The erosion of this influence would have a
profound effect on the individual child and on society as a whole. Child
psychologists and behavioral scientists generally agree that it is
essential to the parent-child relationship that the lines of
communication remain open and that the child be encouraged to “talk
out” his problems. It is therefore critical to a child’s emotional
development that he know that he may explore his problems in an
atmosphere of trust and understanding without fear that his confidences
will later be revealed to others.
Id.; Wendy Meredith Watts, The Parent-Child Privileges: Hardly A New Or
Revolutionary Concept, 28 WM. & MARY L. REV. 583, 604 (1987) (“In order for
parents to exercise their rights to raise their children and instill in them morals
and values, society must encourage a mutual trust between parent and child.”);
Michael D. Moberly, Children should be Seen and not Heard: Advocating the
Recognition of a Parent-Child Privilege in Arizona, 35 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 515, 532
(2003) (“[T]he ability to provide effective parental guidance largely depends
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B. The Provision Inhibits Recovery Where The Tenant Being
Evicted Is Addicted To Illegal Drugs

While the criminal activities at issue in Rucker, smoking
marijuana and possession of cocaine, arguably present dangers to
other tenants, the crimes are generally consequences of substance
abuse.128 This addiction-driven behavior is not similar to “drug
dealers . . . imposing a reign of terror on . . . housing tenants,”129
and this difference is recognized in the way criminal courts have
prosecuted these crimes.130 While drug abuse has largely been
considered a criminal issue, it is now being considered and treated
more consistently as a medical issue.131 Yet, the Provision,
seemingly overlooking the medical aspects of drug abuse, still
provides that tenants may be evicted for using or abusing drugs or
having guests who do so.132
upon the existence of loyal and trusting family relationships.”); Jeff Murrah,
Why Should I Trust You?, (“Trust is an essential part of family life. In . . . [the]
parental relationships, there must be trust. Each person needs to be able to count
on each other, and have that sense of safety that comes from trust within the
home. When trust is established in families, everyone benefits.”), at
http://www.myparentime.com/articles/ articleS43.shtml (last visited Dec. 1,
2003).
128
See Rucker, 535 U.S. at 128.
129
42 U.S.C. § 11901(3) (2003).
130
Asa Hutchinson, Drug Policy In America—A Continuing Debate: An
Effective Drug Policy To Protect America’s Youth And Communities, 30
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 441, 451-52 (2003) (“State criminal laws concerning drug
possession focus on rehabilitative and restorative programs, rather than
automatic incarceration for drug users.”).
131
WASH. STATE BAR ASS’N, Resolution Regarding Drug Abuse Policies in
Washington State (advising that “‘low-level’ drug crimes, such as simple
possession, should be approached as health problems not criminal problems”),
http://www.kcba.org/drug_law/WSBA.pdf (Dec. 11, 2001).
132
See 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l) (2003) (“For purposes of [§ 1437d(l)(6)], the
term ‘drug-related criminal activity’ means the illegal . . . use, or possession
with intent to . . . use . . . a controlled substance.”); see also Rucker, 237 F.3d at
1117 (eviction proceedings instituted against two tenants for smoking
marijuana); HUD Public Housing Lease and Grievance Procedure, 24 C.F.R. §
966.4 (providing for the termination of a tenant’s lease for abusing alcohol
where the “abuse or pattern of abuse . . . threatens the health, safety, or right to
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Evictions conducted against substance abusers are
unreasonably harsh because substance abusers need the stability of
a home to recover—not homelessness.133 Addiction to mood
altering substances such as alcohol or cocaine is a chronic disease
classified with cancer, AIDS and other illnesses, which produce
long-term physical, psychological and social damages.134 While
there is no cure for addiction, it may be effectively treated through
abstinence and sobriety.135 It is well accepted that a vital
component to the addiction recovery process is communication.136
One of the most effective forms of communication geared toward
recovery involves the family.137 Yet, the strict and unforgiving
parameters of the Provision do not allow one the proper means to
recover. Because the Provision impresses an affirmative duty on a
tenant of record to ferret out criminal activity, one who is suffering

peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other residents”).
133
See CONN. CLEARING HOUSE, WHEELER CLINIC, Facts About Drug and
Alcohol Addiction, Treatment, Recovery, and Use (“Family and friends can play
critical roles in motivating individuals with drug and alcohol problems to enter
treatment, stay in it, and maintain sobriety. Family therapy is also important,
especially for adolescents. Additional support is available through the recovery
community in the form of 12-step programs.”), at http://www.ctclearinghouse.
org/FactSheets/fs_treatment_facts_about.pdf (2001).
134
TERENCE T. GORSKI & MERLENE MILLER, STAYING SOBER: A GUIDE
FOR RELAPSE PREVENTION 39-40 (1986); see AMERICAN COUNCIL ON
ALCOHOLISM, What is Alcoholism (defining alcoholism as a fatal addictive
disease), at http://www.aca-usa.org/acadefinition.htm (page last updated July 23,
2003).
135
GORSKI & MILLER, supra note 134, at 50 (“Total abstinence is necessary
to recover from an addiction . . . . Abstinence is a necessary first step for
recovery.”).
136
ANNE GELLER, M.D., RESTORE YOUR LIFE: A LIVING PLAN FOR SOBER
PEOPLE 152 (1991).
137
Id. at 152. See James Garrett, Judith Landau & Robert Shea, The ARISE
Intervention: Using Family and Network Links to Engage Addicted Persons in
Treatment, 15 J. OF SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT 333, 333 (1998) (“The most
well-known and widely applied [treatment alternative to self-help groups for
substance abusers] is the ‘Intervention’ approach . . . [which] proceeds by
enlisting and convening as many of a chemically dependent person’s (CDP’s)
significant others as possible in an effort to induce the CDP to enter
treatment.”).
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from addiction or relapsing is unlikely to come forward and ask a
family member or friend in the public housing project for help for
fear of being reported and subsequently evicted.138 While recovery
is most successful when it is discussed openly in the family unit,
the Provision deprives families of the ability to openly address the
use of illegal drugs because it creates the risk of eviction.139 Thus,
substance abusers are deprived of the family as a valuable
component of their recovery.140
138

See Platoni, supra note 30 (“As a matter of fact, [the Provision] puts
tenants in a situation where they’re afraid to reveal any activity in their homes or
address the issue because they know the moment they say anything, the housing
authority could move to evict them.” (quoting Catherine Bishop of the Oaklandbased National Housing Law Project)). Relapse is typical during the recovery
process and is in some ways to be expected. See also GORSKI & MILLER, supra
note 134, at 112.
139
See GELLER, supra note 136, at 152-55 (discussing how open lines of
communication with family members contributes to the success of an
individual’s recovery from alcohol and drugs).
140
Indigent families often lack access to affordable health services as
compared to wealthy families and thus are already at a disadvantage. See HENRY
J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE
UNINSURED, Key Facts (Jan. 2003), at http://www.kff.org/uninsured/
loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&PageID=14185 (last visited
Dec. 1, 2003).
Low-income Americans (those who earn less than 200% of the federal
poverty level, or $28,256 for a family of three in 2001) run the highest
risk of being uninsured. Over a third of the poor and more than a
quarter of the near-poor lack coverage. The poor and the near-poor
comprise two-thirds (66%) of the uninsured population.
Id. That disadvantage is only amplified when these families are denied the most
simple and basic means to assist in the rehabilitation of addicts within the
family. A family that owns their home is able to recover as a family because
they are not forced to choose between either excluding a family member to
prevent eviction or including him to help him recover. The Provision and its
rules apply only to individuals leasing public housing. See 42 U.S.C. §
1437d(l)(6) (2003) (“Each pubic housing agency shall utilize leases . . . .”)
(emphasis added). The lease Provision effectively denies this same benefit of
recovering as a family to the poor who are only able to rent through public
housing programs and cannot afford to own. This disparate treatment of families
based on wealth and ownership of property is bad public policy. Compare
plaintiff Rucker’s daughter and Florida Gov. Bush’s daughter: both residents of
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C. The Provision Breaks Up Families Through Permanent
Exclusion
One of the more devastating effects of the Provision is that it
divides and breaks up families. Tenants are sometimes given the
option to exclude the offending person as a condition to their
continued occupancy.141 This option effectively is a choice
between losing your home or breaking up your family. This
decision may not be a difficult choice where the individual you are
agreeing to exclude is someone you do not want to visit your
home. Such a decision, however, is extremely difficult when the
person you are being asked to exclude is your child, spouse or
caretaker; but, under the current policy, one who refuses to
permanently exclude will likely be evicted.142
Powell v. Franco illustrates how tenants are forced to choose

housing funded by taxpayers and both had problems with alcohol or drugs, but
the disparate treatment—eviction for a poor elderly woman with no knowledge
of her daughter’s drug use, versus medical treatment for a privileged young
woman with a history of substance abuse and addiction. See Arianna
Huffington, 1 Strike, You’re Out on the Street, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2002, at B13.
141
See HUD Public Housing Lease and Grievance Procedure, 24 C.F.R. §
966.4 (2003) (“Exclusion of culpable household member. The PHA may require
a tenant to exclude a household member in order to continue to reside in the
assisted unit, where that household member has participated in or been culpable
for action or failure to act that warrants termination.”).
142
See Featherstone v. Franco, 742 N.E.2d 607, 610 (N.Y. 2000)
(terminating tenant’s lease when tenant “refused a possible mitigated sanction
predicated upon [her 18 year old son’s] . . . permanent exclusion [from the
apartment]”); Patrick v. Hernandez, 765 N.Y.S.2d 508, 508 (N.Y. App. Div.
2003) (affirming the housing authority’s termination of a tenant’s lease for
violating, on at least one occasion, a stipulation to permanently exclude her son
from the home); Holiday v. Franco, 709 N.Y.S.2d 523, 527 (N.Y. App. Div.
2000) (annulling the housing authority’s termination of a tenant’s lease for
violating a stipulation to exclude her son where the son came to the home on one
occasion without the tenant’s knowledge and the tenant was in her late sixties,
resided in New York City Housing Authority premises since 1957 with an
unblemished record and her household included a disabled daughter); see also
Robinson v. Martinez, 764 N.Y.S.2d 94 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003) (illustrating the
difficulty with excluding a family member from one’s home). See supra text
accompanying notes 97-99 (discussing the facts of Robinson v. Martinez).
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between breaking up their family and most likely homelessness.143
In Powell, New York’s Appellate Division reversed a
determination by the housing authority that the tenants
permanently exclude their son as a condition to remain in
housing.144 The court held that conditioning the tenants’ continued
occupancy upon permanently excluding their son was shocking to
its sense of fairness where the son pled to disorderly conduct,
performed five days of community service, the incident was
isolated and the family was otherwise law-abiding and stable.145
While some might argue it is drug use that breaks up families, it is
also true that the recovery process can strengthen the family in
many ways.146 Indeed, families fulfill a critical role for delinquent
youths as systems of emotional support and models of appropriate
behavior.147 Disrupting the family unit negatively impacts
143

684 N.Y.S.2d 226, 226 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (finding the housing
authority “required the permanent exclusion of petitioners’ son, Kenneth, as a
condition of their continued occupancy in public housing”).
144
Id. In Powell, the tenants’ son was arrested after he was seen making
several “hand-to-hand” exchanges with individuals and was found with what the
arresting officer believed was crack cocaine. Id.
145
Id. at 226-27. While the Appellate Division was able to protect the
family in this instance, it is important to note that the case was nonetheless
brought against the indigent family. In this case, the family was fortunate to
secure representation, yet many poor families are unable to afford representation
in civil cases, and thus, are unlikely to challenge such inappropriate applications
of permanent exclusion. See Di Angelo v. Illinois Dep’t of Pub. Aid, 891 F.2d
1260, 1262 (7th Cir. 1989) (“Indigent civil litigants have no constitutional right
to counsel at the expense of another—whether of the adversary or of the private
bar.”). On one hand, it makes sense to have public housing managers
responsible for recommending eviction in that they are on site everyday and are
in touch with the severity of the problems that exist. On the other hand it places
a great deal of power and responsibility in the hands of a group of people
responsible for managing buildings who are not necessarily capable of making
difficult and sensitive decisions regarding crime, the elderly and families. While
the courts can serve as a check on potential abuses, this is only effective if the
people can afford to utilize the courts. This is uncertain where people are
indigent.
146
GELLER, supra note 136, at 164-65.
147
Debra A. Madden-Derdich, Stacie A. Leonard & Gordon A. Gunnel,
Parents’ and Children’s Perceptions of Family Processes in Inner-City Families
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delinquent behavior.148
D. The Provision Is Unconscionable Rendering the Lease an
Unconscionable Contract
The Court has characterized the government’s role in
connection with public housing “as a landlord of property that it
owns, invoking a clause in a lease to which respondents have
agreed and which Congress has expressly required.”149 This
characterization, however, is over-simplified and inaccurate. The
government is not simply a landlord,150 and the tenants had
with Delinquent Youths: A Qualitative Investigation, 28 J. MARITAL & FAM.
THERAPY 355, 356 (2002).
148
Id. (findings supported previous empirical research highlighting the
importance of family interaction processes in the lives of delinquent youths). See
UNITED STATES DEPT. OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND
DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, Risk Factors for Delinquency: An Overview,
(“Family characteristics such as poor parenting skills, family size, home discord,
child maltreatment, and antisocial parents are risk factors linked to juvenile
delinquency.”), at http://www.ncjrs.org/html/ojjdp/jjjournal_2003_2/ page3.html
(last visited Nov. 28, 2003).
149
Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 134-35 (2002)
(finding “‘no-fault’ eviction is a common ‘incident of tenant responsibility under
normal landlord-tenant law and practice’”) (citation omitted); see Hous. Auth. v.
Chapman, 780 N.E.2d 1106 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (finding that a tenant assumed
the obligations of a valid contract in signing a lease for public housing); HUD
Public Housing Lease and Grievance Procedure, 56 Fed. Reg. 51560, 51567
(Oct. 11, 1991) (“As in a conventional tenancy, a public housing tenant holds
tenure of the unit subject to the requirements of the lease . . . .”) (emphasis
added).
150
See 42 U.S.C. § 1437(a)(1)(A) (2003) (“It is the policy of the United
States . . . to promote the general welfare of the Nation . . . as provided in this
Act . . . to assist States and political subdivisions of States to remedy the unsafe
housing conditions and the acute shortage of decent and safe dwellings for lowincome families.”). Unlike a landlord in a simple lease assignment who enters
into agreements with the expectation of profits, the government did not create
public housing to generate income. See U.S DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV.,
What is Public Housing (“Public housing was established to provide decent and
safe rental housing for eligible low-income families, the elderly, and persons
with disabilities.”), at http://www.hud.gov/renting/ phprog.cfm (last updated
Dec. 5, 2000).
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virtually no choice but to agree to the contracts’ terms.151 In light
of the tenants’ absence of choice and the leases’ grossly
unfavorable terms, the Court is arguably enforcing unconscionable
contracts.152
151

See Rucker v. Davis, 237 F.3d 1113, 1125 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc),
rev’d sub nom. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 (2002)
(“There is certainly no bargained-for-exchange in public housing leases. The
form of public housing leases is almost entirely dictated by HUD.”); see also
United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289, 327 (1942) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting). Justice Frankfurter stated:
“[] [I]f one party has the power of saying to the other, ‘that which you
require shall not be done except upon the conditions which I choose to
impose,’ no person can contend that they stand upon anything like an
equal footing.” . . . The fundamental principle of law that the courts
will not enforce a bargain where one party has unconscionably taken
advantage of the necessities and distress of the other has found
expression in an almost infinite variety of cases.
Id. (citations omitted).
152
“Unconscionability has generally been recognized to include an absence
of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract
terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party.” Williams v. WalkerThomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965). Generally, the
unconscionable contract requires inequality “so strong and manifest as to shock
the conscience and confound the judgment of any (person) of common sense.”
See Christian v. Christian, 365 N.E.2d 849, 855 (N.Y. 1977) (quoting Mandel v.
Liebman, 100 N.E.2d 149, 152 (N.Y. 1951)). Courts have utilized the language
of unconscionable contacts when they have been confronted with strict liability
evictions. See Holiday v. Franco, 709 N.Y.S.2d 523, 526 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000)
(finding tenants expulsion from her home “shocking to the conscience” where
her excluded son was found in her apartment on a single occasion and the tenant
was a longtime tenant, cared for her disabled daughter and had an unblemished
record as a tenant); Spand v. Franco, 663 N.Y.S.2d 813, 813 (N.Y. App. Div.
1997) (holding eviction of petitioner was “shocking to one’s sense of fairness”
where petitioner was involved in one isolated incident, had no other violations
and there was no indication that she posed any risk to other tenants or property);
Charlotte Hous. Auth. v. Patterson, 464 S.E.2d 68, 72-73 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995)
(holding that to evict the tenant and her daughters “with no evidence of fault on
their part for the shooting would . . . indeed shock our sense of fairness”);
Brown v. Popolizio, 569 N.Y.S.2d 615, 622 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (“It would
be shocking to one’s sense of fairness to terminate the tenancies of persons who
have not committed ‘nondesirable acts’ and have not had control over those who
have committed such acts.”); New York City Hous. Auth. v. Watson, 207
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Standards developed in the common law doctrine of
unconscionability generally govern whether a clause in a real
estate lease is unconscionable.153 Courts generally do not enforce
unconscionable contracts.154 A contract is unconscionable where
there is both procedural and substantive inequality.155 The key
components rendering the clause or the entirety of a contract
unconscionable are, first, lack of meaningful choice and, second,
unreasonably favorable terms to the party seeking enforcement.156
N.Y.S.2d 920, 924 (App. Term 1960) (Hofstadter, J., dissenting) (arguing that
affirming the housing authority’s eviction of a family based solely on the
criminal activity of the father when the father was incarcerated “shocks the
conscience”). Thus, it can be fairly said that courts have brought the common
law doctrine of unconscionability to bear on the issue of no fault evictions.
153
Halprin v. 2 Fifth Ave. Co., 422 N.Y.S.2d 275, 279 (N.Y. County
Super. Ct. 1979), rev’d on other grounds, 427 N.Y.S.2d 258 (N.Y. App. Div.
1980), aff’d, 434 N.E.2d 244 (N.Y. 1982).
154
See Scott v. United States, 79 U.S. 443, 445 (1870) (“If a contract be
unreasonable and unconscionable, but not void for fraud, a court of law will give
to the party who sues for its breach damages, not according to its letter, but only
such as he is equitably entitled to.”). See also Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S. at
326 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
Does any principle in our law have more universal application than the
doctrine that courts will not enforce transactions in which the relative
positions of the parties are such that one has unconscionably taken
advantage of the necessities of the other? . . . Fraud and physical duress
are not the only grounds upon which courts refuse to enforce
contracts . . . . More specifically, the courts generally refuse to lend
themselves to the enforcement of a ‘bargain’ in which one party has
unjustly taken advantage of the economic necessities of the other . . . .
The fundamental principle of law that the courts will not enforce a
bargain where one party has unconscionably taken advantage of the
necessities and distress of the other has found expression in an almost
infinite variety of cases.
Id. at 326-28.
155
See Williams, 350 F.2d at 449; see also Sablosky v. Gordon Co., 535
N.E.2d 643, 647 (N.Y. 1989) (explaining that an unconscionable contract is a
contract where both substantive and procedural unfairness exist); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981).
156
See Williams, 350 F.2d at 449 (“Unconscionability has generally been
recognized to include an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the
parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the
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In determining whether meaningful choice exists, one must
consider the totality of the transaction, and if there is a gross
inequality of bargaining power, meaningful choice is not
present.157
Meaningful choice implies an alternative—a decision after
considering more than one option.158 Yet, public housing tenants
are essentially presented with two options: the Provision in the
lease, or, if they choose not to sign the lease, homelessness, which
is no option.159 The procedural inequality is also manifest in the
circumstances surrounding the formation of the contract, including
the circumstances of the parties at the signing of the contract.160
People can wait up to ten years for public housing.161 And wait
other party.”).
157
See id. (stating the unreasonableness or unfairness of the terms of the
contract must be considered in light of the circumstances that existed when the
contract was made); see also Christian v. Christian, 365 N.E.2d 849, 855 (N.Y.
1977) (noting that an unconscionable contract has been described as one where
“‘no (person) in his (or her) senses and not under delusion would make on the
one hand, and as no honest and fair (person) would accept on the other’”
(quoting Hume v. United States, 132 U.S. 406, 411 (1889))).
158
WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 258 (4th ed. 1999).
159
See Weidman v. Tomaselli, 365 N.Y.S.2d 681, 687 (Rockland County
Ct. 1975), aff’d, 386 N.Y.S.2d 276 (App. Term 1975) (“The Court takes judicial
notice that food, clothing, shelter, and employment are necessities of life. The
respondents must seek and obtain housing for themselves and for their infant
daughter. The respondents do not have the alternative of foregoing shelter, nor is
any natural shelter, such as a cave, available to them.”); see also Featherstone v.
Franco, 703 N.Y.S.2d 11, 13 (App. Div. 2000) (Rubin, J., dissenting) (finding
“public housing is a last resort for many of its residents”), aff’d, 742 N.E.2d 607
(N.Y. 2000).
160
See Villa Milano Homeowners Ass’n v. Il. Davorge, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d
1, 7 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (noting that procedural inequality analysis in an
unconscionable contract focuses on oppression which is found where there is
“an absence of real negotiation or a meaningful choice on the part of the weaker
party”).
161
See U.S. MAYOR’S HOUSING FACT SHEET, supra note 10, at 2 (finding
families in some large cities wait ten years or more for an available unit of
public housing); Kathleen McGowan, Nation’s Poorest Wait (and Wait) for
Housing Help (finding the typical wait for public housing in New York City can
be up to eight years), at http://www.tenant.net/Tengroup/Metcounc/Apr99
/poorest.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2003).
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they must for there is a serious lack of affordable housing
alternatives.162 Under such conditions the sharp imbalance between
the bargaining power of the waiting tenant and that of housing
authority is exacerbated—the longer the wait, the greater the
desperation and the weaker the bargaining strength of the tenant.163
Further, the tenants are neither able to bargain out the harsh
Provision, nor are they likely to be in a position to rent on the
private market.164 Finally, the lease is virtually entirely dictated by
the Department of Housing and Urban Development.165 These
factors, when considered as a whole, demonstrate a lack of
meaningful choice that significantly contributes to the procedural
unfairness.166

162

See U.S. MAYOR’S HOUSING FACT SHEET, supra note 10, at 2 (noting
how public housing and subsidized apartments fall far short of the need and
waiting lists for public housing have grown to about 1 million households);
NATIONAL COALITION FOR THE HOMELESS, The Affordable Housing Crisis and
Homelessness in New York City, The Problem and the Solutions (“According to
Census Bureau statistics, in 1999 there was shortage of nearly 390,000
affordable apartments for extremely-low-income renter household in New York
City (i.e., households earning less than $16,100 per year). In contrast, in 1970
there was actually a surplus of more than 270,000 affordable apartments for
extremely-low-income renters.”), at http://www.coalitionforthehomeless.org/
home/downloads/nychousing01.pdf (updated Sept. 2002).
163
See supra note 161 and infra note 166.
164
See Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 128-29
(2002) (finding HUD regulations administering § 1437d(l)(6) “require lease
terms authorizing evictions” even where the tenant had no knowledge of the
criminal activity); see also U.S. MAYOR’S HOUSING FACT SHEET, supra note 10
(noting the widening public housing gap between supply and demand and that
no significant new public housing has been built in the past twenty-five years);
id. (“Almost 2 million low- and moderate- income working families pay more
than half of their income on rent or live in severely inadequate housing.”).
165
Rucker v. Davis, 237 F.3d 1113, 1126 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc), rev’d
sub nom. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 (2002) (finding
that there is “no bargained-for-exchange in public housing leases” . . . and
“public housing leases [are] almost entirely dictated by HUD”).
166
See United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289, 326 (1942)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Justice Frankfurter stated:
[T]he courts generally refuse to lend themselves to the enforcement of a
“bargain” in which one party has unjustly taken advantage of the
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The unfavorable terms of the public housing lease are manifest
in the fact that it allows tenants to be evicted not for their own
criminal acts, but instead, for the criminal acts of third parties.167
The unreasonable terms are hardly more apparent than in Rucker,
where, despite efforts by the plaintiffs to prevent criminal activity,
eviction proceedings were still pursued by the local housing
authority.168 In light of the advanced age of the people evicted and
that the tenants had neither participated in nor committed criminal
activity, the Provision’s effect shocks the conscience.169 It is
economic necessities of the other. “And there is great reason and justice
in this rule, for necessitous men are not, truly speaking, free men, but,
to answer a present exigency, will submit to any terms that the crafty
may impose upon them.”
Id. (citation omitted).
167
Rucker, 237 F.3d at 1124 (“HUD conceded at oral argument that there
was nothing more Pearlie Rucker could have done to protect herself from
eviction, but argued that the statute authorized her eviction nonetheless.”). See
Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 466 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(“Fundamental fairness prohibits the punishment of innocent people.”).
168
See Rucker v. Davis, No. C 98-00781, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9345, at
*5-8 (N.D. Cal. June 24, 1998), vacated, 203 F.3d 627 (9th Cir. 2000), amended
by 237 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc), rev’d sub nom. Dep’t of Hous. &
Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 (2002) (finding Ms. Rucker regularly
searched her daughter’s room for evidence of drug and alcohol activity; Ms. Hill
and Ms. Lee were not alleged to have knowledge of their grandsons’ marijuana
use and in fact warned them that such conduct could result in eviction); see also
Rucker, 237 F.3d at 1117 (Mr. Walker fired his caregiver, upon whom he was
dependent, short after receiving an eviction notice). Admittedly, the housing
authorities are not required to evict tenants and “may consider all circumstances
relevant to a particular case,” HUD Public Housing Lease and Grievance
Procedure, 24 C.F.R. § 966.4 (2003), however, this discretion may create a
greater level of insecurity in that the tenants may be subject to the whims of the
housing authority. See supra note 51 (discussing how housing authorities are not
required to consider mitigating factors before evicting, but may do so in their
discretion).
169
See supra note 152 (citing courts that have utilized the phrase, “shocks
the conscience,” in connection with no-fault evictions). The shocking effect of
the provision is illustrated by the eviction proceedings instituted against Mr.
Walker who was elderly, partially paralyzed and a former minister. Cruz Lat,
supra note 33 (describing Mr. Walker as a “former minister, . . . 75, partially
paralyzed in his left arm, and suffer[ing] from severe arthritis”). Nonetheless, he
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unlikely that the majority of law abiding public housing tenants or
fair-minded citizens find such evictions reasonable—especially
where the innocent tenant is elderly or infirm and has been a good
tenant for over twenty years.170 The Provision contained in the
lease is an example of poor public policy.171
apparently constituted a threat to the community and needed to be removed just
like the drug dealers. Jim Herron Zamora, ‘One Strike’ Tenants Keep
Apartments in Oakland; 3 of 4 Evictions Dropped Although Law Upheld, SAN
FRANCISCO CHRON., Apr. 5, 2002, at A21 (Joe Gresley, executive director of the
Oakland Housing Authority stated: “Mr. Walker’s continued occupancy of an
apartment in a building housing other seniors poses a threat to other residents of
the building.”).
170
See Rucker, 237 F.3d at 1126; Brown v. Popolizio, 569 N.Y.S.2d 615,
622-23 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (“It would be shocking to one’s sense of fairness
to terminate the tenancies of persons who have not committed ‘nondesirable
acts’ and have not had control over those who have committed such acts.”); see
also Emelyn Cruz Lat, Oakland Tenants Sue Over 1 Strike Eviction Policy, SAN
FRANCISCO EXAMINER, Mar. 4, 1998, at A-9 (“At a gut level it strikes you as
incredibly unconscionable to throw seniors out on the street who had been good
tenants for a long period of time for something they had no knowledge of or
participation in.” (quoting Anne Tamiko Omura, of the Eviction Defense
Center)).
171
Additionally, it may be argued that the leases the tenants are entering
into are nothing more than oppressive and unfair contracts of adhesion. CORBIN
ON CONTRACTS § 1.4 (noting that contracts of adhesion are part of our society to
be neither condemned nor praised but analyzed and that courts are to protect the
adhering party from oppression by a stronger party). While contracts of adhesion
are necessary in our society and play an important role in minimizing transaction
costs, by their nature they are created with the most favorable possible terms to
the party offering the form. CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1.4. In Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960), the plaintiff bought a car
through a standardized purchase agreement and the steering broke; however, the
defendant car dealer disclaimed all warranties—implied and express. Id. at 80.
The court held the disclaimer void. Id. at 95. Signing a contract without reading
it is done at one’s own risk. But where the loss of important rights are involved,
there are overriding public policy considerations that protect ordinary people
from loss of those rights. Id. at 92. In Henningsen, an inequality in bargaining
power between the “Big Three” automakers and car buyers created a lack of
competition leaving the buyer without meaningful choice or alternative options.
Id. at 87. The court found that “the disclaimer of an implied warranty of
merchantability by the dealer, as well as the attempted elimination of all
obligations other than replacement of defective parts, are violative of public
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IV. FINDING AN ALTERNATIVE
The individual rights of tenants appears to be an afterthought in
Congress’ enactment of the Provision and the Court’s subsequent
interpretation in Rucker.172 A better policy, however, is one that
will protect the leasehold interest of the innocent public housing
tenant and assure them that so long as they live within the law,
they will be safe in their homes from both criminals and the
government.173 Because the Supreme Court has ruled on the issue
of knowledge, the following suggestions are necessarily directed
toward Congress.174
A. No Strict Liability Requirement in Leases
Congress should eliminate the strict liability requirement in the
leases each tenant signs.175 Congress could do this in one of two
ways: by writing a knowledge requirement into the statute or by
enacting a provision expressly providing an innocent lessee
exemption.176 The innocent lessee exemption could mirror the

policy and void.” Id. at 97. Similarly, it is contrary to public policy to have
people sign leases allowing them to be evicted for the criminal act of another
when they are presented with no other realistic options. It could be seen as
oppressive and unfair to say to a desperate and indigent person: “Here is the
lease—take it or leave it” knowing full well they have no option but to take it,
and with it, the unreasonable Provision. See supra text accompanying notes 153,
159-66 (discussing the lack of meaningful choice for tenants).
172
42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6) (2003); Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v.
Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 (2002).
173
88-09 Realty LLC v. Hill, 737 N.Y.S.2d 227, 231 (N.Y. App. Term
2001) (Patterson, J., dissenting) (affirming the important objective of combating
the drug crisis, but recognizing that “[i]t can and should be accomplished . . .
without the need to dispossess a tenant who is wholly unconnected to any illegal
activities”).
174
Rucker, 535 U.S. at 130.
175
See § 1437d(l)(6). “[A]ny criminal activity . . . engaged in by a public
housing tenant, any member of the tenant’s household, or any guest or other
person under the tenant’s control, shall be cause for termination of tenancy.” Id.
176
Such a requirement would be similar to New York’s knowledge or
acquiescence requirement, see infra note 181, or New Jersey’s Anti-Eviction
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innocent owner defense set forth in the Controlled Substances
Act.177 Pursuant to the exemption, a tenant would not be evicted
where he did not know of the conduct or was aware of it and did
all that could reasonably have been expected to stop the activity.178
An innocent lessee exemption surely would have protected Pearlie
Rucker who, at sixty-three, took affirmative steps to prevent
criminal activity by searching her daughter’s room for any possible
contraband.179 It also would have protected Mr. Walker, who fired
his aide.180 A knowledge requirement could be similar to the
knowledge or acquiescence requirement which has been utilized by
New York courts.181 Pursuant to the requirement, a tenant would
not be evicted unless they knew of or acquiesced in the criminal
conduct.182 Such a requirement would have protected Ms. Hill and

Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.1-61.12 (West 2003). That statute permits
eviction of a tenant or lessee who “knowingly harbors or harbored [in the leased
premises] a person who committed [a drug offense], or otherwise permits or
permitted such a person to occupy those premises for residential purposes,
whether continuously or intermittently.” Id. at § 2A:18-61.1(p).
177
See supra notes 38-39 (discussing the innocent owner defense in the
Controlled Substances Act).
178
Id.
179
Rucker v. Davis, 237 F.3d 1113, 1117 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc), rev’d
sub nom. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 (2002)
(“Rucker asserts that she regularly searches her daughter’s room for evidence of
alcohol and drug use and has never found any evidence or observed any sign of
drug use by her daughter.”).
180
Bob Egelko, HUD’s Drug Rule Overturned; Appeals Court Says One
Strike Rule Evicts Tenants Unfairly, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Jan. 25, 2001, at
A6 (reporting how Herman Walker fired his caretaker as soon as he could find a
replacement, as he needed around the clock care).
181
See Remeeder H.D.F.C., Inc. v. Francis, No. 2000-1406 K C, slip op. at
5 (N.Y. App. Term Dec. 6, 2001) (Patterson, J., dissenting) (“in order to
demonstrate ‘use’ of the premises for illegal purposes . . . a tenant must have
knowledge of and acquiesce to the use of the demised premises for such an
illegal activity” (quoting Clifton Ct. v. Williams, N.Y. L.J., May 27, 1998, at
28)); 220 W. 42 Assocs. v. Cohen, 302 N.Y.S.2d 494, 498 (N.Y. App. Term
1969) (“In the case of the tenant the illegal acts must be established by landlord,
which must also show either participation or acquiescence by the tenant.”).
182
See 220 W. 42 Assocs., 302 N.Y.S.2d at 498.
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Ms. Lee who did not know of their grandsons’ drug use.183
Although strict liability eases enforcement and saves the cost
of trying each case individually, it threatens all tenants, even those
who take action to eradicate the possibility of wrongdoing.184 The
innocent tenant is the one who suffers most directly by the strict
liability standard. All of the tenants in Rucker, it can be argued,
were exemplary tenants in that they did not look the other way, but
took action.185 Nevertheless, under the strict liability standard, this
does not amount to much, and in all of their cases eviction
proceedings were brought against them.186
B. Provide Legal Services
While the strict liability standard may be easily remedied
through Congressional action, public housing tenants are not a
group exercising much political clout, so the realistic possibility of
Congress actually responding may be remote.187 In light of this, the
local housing authorities, which have discretion to bring eviction
proceedings, are urged to ensure that housing managers and
housing court judges are properly trained to administer the laws

183

Rucker v. Davis, No. C 98-00781, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9345, at *7
(N.D. Cal. June 24, 1998), vacated, 203 F.3d 627 (9th Cir. 2000), amended by
237 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc), rev’d sub nom. Dep’t of Hous. &
Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 (2002).
184
See Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 134 (2002)
(“Strict liability maximizes deterrence and eases enforcement difficulties.”).
185
See supra Part I.B.1 (describing the plaintiffs in Rucker).
186
See Rucker, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9345.
187
See Richard H. McAdams, New and Critical Approaches to Law and
Economics (Part II) Norms Theory: An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, 79
OR. L. REV. 339, 360-61(2000) (discussing public choice theory and “rentseeking” where “lobbying groups influence legislators with campaign
contributions and other favors”); see also Jody Freeman, The Private Role In
Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 561 (2000) (“Public choice theory
understands administrative decisions as the product of interest group pressure
brought to bear on bureaucrats seeking rewards such as job security, enhanced
authority, or the favor of powerful legislators upon whom the agency
depends.”).
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justly by requiring them to consider mitigating circumstances.188
Few decisions can be truly just and fair where the tenant being
evicted lacks the resources to challenge the eviction. One of the
surest ways to prevent these often-unjust evictions and lend them a
degree of legitimacy is to provide the indigent tenants with legal
services, which are often lacking in civil matters.189 While this
would increase the administrative burden, it is a burden we ought
to bear in light of the seriousness of the issue—homelessness.190
In Brown v. Popolizio, for instance, Cozyella Coe, an innocent
tenant, had termination proceedings brought against her when her
twenty-year-old son was arrested on project grounds for unlawfully
possessing cocaine with intent to sell.191 Ms. Coe contacted a legal
services organization to represent her, but they were unable to do
so, and after one adjournment, the judge decided to go forward
with the case.192 Ms. Coe did not object to any of the testimony,
188

By justly, I mean carefully applying the factors set forth in 24 C.F.R. §
966.4 (2003). Those factors are:
PHA termination of tenancy for criminal activity or alcohol abuse . . . .
Consideration of circumstances. In a manner consistent with such
policies, procedures and practices, the PHA may consider all
circumstances relevant to a particular case such as the seriousness of
the offending action, the extent of participation by the leaseholder in
the offending action, the effects that the eviction would have on family
members not involved in the offending activity and the extent to which
the leaseholder has shown personal responsibility and has taken all
reasonable steps to prevent or mitigate the offending action.
Id.
189
Jonathan L. Hafetz, Homeless Legal Advocacy: New Challenges and
Directions for the Future, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1215, 1254-55 (2003)
(arguing that legal advocacy can help prevent homelessness resulting from
eviction proceedings brought in housing court’s across the country, and that
while the landlords have legal representation, the majority of tenants do not).
190
See supra notes 10, 161, & 164 (discussing the shortage of affordable
housing).
191
569 N.Y.S.2d 615, 617-19 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991).
192
Id. at 618. After receiving the termination notice, Ms. Coe contacted a
community legal services organization, however they were unable to assist her
because they were understaffed. Id. at 617. The matter was adjourned and the
organization later took her case, however the volunteer attorney was unable to
prepare for the case due to her inexperience and limited schedule. Id. at 617-18.
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nor did she cross-examine witnesses, present witnesses, testify on
her own behalf or present a closing argument.193 Nonetheless, the
hearing officer recommended termination of tenancy.194 On appeal,
the appellate division held the housing authority’s imposition of
the maximum penalty, eviction, to be excessive.195 This result
demonstrates that pursuing such senseless evictions is a waste of
judicial resources and is disruptive to the family by putting it in
serious jeopardy of becoming homeless.
C. Institute Second-Chance Policy
While evicting only the criminal actor may be better than
evicting the whole family, even evicting the actor when he engages
in low-level criminal activity splits the family unit.196 The break-up
of the family may be a factor in furthering criminal activity and
may perpetuate the cycle of violence in the public housing
communities.197 A more sensible approach that would still allow
the housing authorities to take action to protect residents and at the
same time preserve the family unit would be a second chance
policy when non-violent crimes are at issue. The focus would be
more on rehabilitation and less on punishment. Again, while this
may create more of an administrative burden and increased costs,
they are costs that should be borne in order to enhance the stability
of families, which will in turn benefit communities by reducing the

Counsel for the housing authority refused to consent to another adjournment and
the matter proceeded despite Ms. Coe’s lack of counsel and inability to represent
herself. Id. at 618. When asked if she was prepared to represent herself Ms. Coe
said “no” but the Hearing Officer proceeded in any event because she was
unable to suggest a way she might obtain an attorney. Id.
193
Id. at 618.
194
Id.
195
Id. at 621-22.
196
See supra Part III.C (discussing the policy of permanent exclusion as a
condition to continued occupancy).
197
OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, Profile of Jail Inmates 1996 (reporting 6 in 10 inmates grew up in
homes without both parents), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/pji96.pdf
(revised June 4, 1998).
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likelihood of criminal activity occurring.198
For example, if someone is caught using drugs the offender
should have the option to participate in a state mandated program
of rehabilitation or job training—a tactic similarly employed by
community courts.199 The court could focus on whether the tenant
is complying as a measure of whether the tenant should be entitled
198

Preventing Youth Violence And Crime: The Role of Families, School
and Government: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Early Childhood, Youth and
Families of the Comm. on Education and The Workforce, 106th Cong. 106-54
(1999) (statement of Dr. Darnell Jackson, Director, Office of Drug Control
Policy, Michigan Department of Community Health), available at
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/edu/hedcew6-54.000/hedcew6-54.htm
(last visited Nov. 18, 2003). Dr. Jackson stated:
I think we need a clearer recognition that government alone cannot
possibly be a surrogate parent for every troubled youth. Nothing can
replace the role of communities, churches, faith, and family. Not
surprisingly, a University of Maryland study released last month
confirms children of parents who keep close tabs on their whereabouts
and have knowledge of who their friends are, are less likely to use
alcohol, get involved in drug usage, and more likely to be peer leaders
in their groups; so clearly the most important role in deterring antisocial
behavior of youth is with the parents.
Id.; see also CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, NATIONAL
CENTER FOR INJURY PREVENTION AND CONTROL, Best Practices of Youth
Violence Prevention: A Sourcebook for Community Action 41 (“Parents’
interactions with each other, their behavior toward their children, and their
emotional state have been shown to be important predictors of children’s violent
behavior . . . . Marital conflict and a lack of communication between parents
have also been identified as risk factors for youth violence.”), at
http://www.cdc.gov/ncipc/dvp/bestpractices /chapter2a.pdf (revised June 2002).
199
See CENTER FOR COURT INNOVATION, Demonstration Projects Midtown
Community Court, at http://www.courtinnovation.org/demo_01mcc.html (last
visited Nov. 12, 2003).
Midtown Community Court sentences low-level offenders to pay back
the neighborhood through community service while at the same time
offering them help with problems that often underlie criminal behavior.
Residents, businesses and social service agencies collaborate with the
Court by supervising community service projects and by providing onsite social services, including drug treatment, health care and job
training.
Id.
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to continued occupancy of the premises. If it is shown that the
tenant is not complying with the program or is repeatedly
offending, then the privilege of opting to participate in the program
can be revoked and eviction proceedings instituted. If the offense
involves the selling of narcotics on housing grounds, the court
should give the tenant one chance, but also sentence the tenant and
require community service to be performed inside the housing
community.
D. Community Based Crime Reduction and Prevention
Strategies
A final suggestion is merely to encourage public housing
authorities to continue community-based crime reduction and
prevention strategies that have already significantly reduced crime
in housing communities.200 Among the effective strategies
employed by housing authorities which experienced declining
crime rates were partnerships with the police department to
provide additional security and investigative services in targeted
communities, a community policing program utilizing foot patrols,
crime prevention demonstrations and screening of new applicants’
backgrounds.201 In light of the success of these alternative
strategies employed to reduce crime, there is not a need for the
strict no-fault eviction policy of section 1437d(l)(6). These
methods of crime prevention demonstrate that safety can be
achieved without innocent tenants forfeiting the security of their
home.
CONCLUSION
While the government has taken steps to protect tenants living
in public housing, the policy of strict liability negatively affects

200

IN THE CROSSFIRE, supra note 8, at 10. In Birmingham, Alabama,
assaults in public housing developments fell 27 percent, from 533 in 1992 to 389
in 1996. Id. Similarly, in Forth Worth, Texas, violent crime in public housing
was reduced by 37 percent, from 536 in 1993 to 340 in 1997. Id. at 11.
201
IN THE CROSSFIRE, supra note 8, at 10-11.
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law-abiding tenants by subjecting them to eviction. Where housing
is scarce, as it is in many of our large urban centers, subjecting
these innocent and often elderly tenants to homelessness is as big a
threat as any drug dealer. Congress is unlikely to rewrite the
Provision soon in light of the lack of political clout public housing
residents possess due to their minority and poor status.202 Thus, the
burden is upon the local housing authorities to exercise care and
discretion in handling eviction proceedings. Housing authorities
have a duty to ensure that families and elderly persons are not
displaced for the actions of third parties, over which they had no
control. We need not choose between protecting the individual
rights of tenants and ensuring their safety.

202

See supra note 187 (discussing public choice theory).

